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Summary
Ten years after the start of the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe, the
establishment of a viable sector of private small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
and the design of an efficient financial system are two of the most important tasks facing
economic policy-makers in those countries and also the multilateral and bilateral
development organisations. Numerous projects have been, and are still being initiated
with the goal of systematically promoting the SME sector by improving their financing
situation.
One approach specifically designed to achieve these tasks is the strategy, currently being
pursued by Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) on behalf of the German government,
which centres on the establishment of “promotional banks”. The approach is based on
the hypothesis that a financial sector organised according to the principles of private
enterprise is a necessary precondition for economic development. However, such
financial sectors tend not to provide SMEs, defined by economic policy-makers as a
priority sector, with the long-term financing they need, even though in principle the
commercial banks may have the requisite credit technology. The commercial banks’
reluctance to finance SMEs is attributed to the fact that they do not have access to
(sufficient) long-term funds and/or to the fact that they do not regard lending to the
target group as a potentially profit-maximising business.
The promotional bank approach seeks to overcome this market failure by channelling
inexpensive long-term funds to the target group via local commercial banks and savings
banks, which bear full liability for the loans. However, to be able to achieve its
economic policy goals, the promotional bank itself should not be committed to profit
maximisation. Rather, it must be majority-owned by state and/or public sector entities.
A unique feature of this approach is that KfW’s own history and organisational structure
serve as a model for project design. There are two reasons why this should be so: one is
that KfW’s main line of business in the Federal Republic of Germany is the promotion
of the small and medium-sized enterprise sector; the other is that KfW made a decisive
contribution to the reconstruction of (West) Germany after the Second World War. Not
least in comparison to the development bank approach, which is generally regarded as
having failed, the (successful) activities of KfW in Germany are therefore seen as
decisive empirical proof of the hypothesis that promotional banks can be an effective
instrument for improving the financing situation of the target group in the transition
economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States.
Analysis of post-war Germany and the role of KfW in its development shows, however,
that KfW did not in fact adopt the promotional bank approach in the early years, but that
it initially functioned as a bank for reconstruction in the classic sense. Not until 1971
did KfW begin to apply the promotional bank approach on a major scale. Yet at that
time the prevailing conditions in West Germany, both in the small and medium-sized
enterprise sector and in the financial sector, were very different from the situation inVI
which these sectors operate in the transition economies. Whereas in Germany a
Mittelstand, a sector of well-established medium-sized firms, had evolved over several
decades under a largely market-based economic order, in the transition economies
almost all of the private enterprises were founded comparatively recently, and are
having to struggle for survival in an uncertain market environment. The great mass of
these firms fall into the category of micro and small enterprises, and accordingly their
situation is very unpredictable: businesses enter and exit the market from one day to the
next, and are likely to move abruptly from one line of business to another.
A comparison of banking systems reveals similarly substantial differences between the
(West) Germany of the 1970s and the transition economies of today. Whereas in
Germany all of the indicators used to measure financial system development (volume of
outstanding loans to the private sector as a percentage of gross domestic product, short-
versus long-term lending, interest rate differentials) showed favourable trends or could
be read as a sign of stability, the banking systems of most transition economies are
extremely crisis-prone, and contribute either not at all or only very selectively to the
financing of the private sector in general, i.e. not only small and medium-sized
enterprises but also many large ones have very limited access to credit. An important
reason for this is the banks’ lack of appropriate credit technologies, which leads to high
rates of non-performing loans. This difference can also be attributed not least of all to
the fact that the post-war German banking system was able to look back on a long and
successful tradition within a market-based environment, whereas the banking systems of
Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS are having to be built up from scratch and
consequently lack any such tradition.
Moreover, since 1948, the corporate governance of KfW has been characterised by a
delicate balance between professional banking practice on the one side and on the other,
a politically defined mission, state ownership and government influence. Yet judging by
the relationship between the political and the economic spheres in most of the reforming
transition economies, it appears highly unlikely that the new promotional banks will be
able, solely on the basis of their respective founding laws and charters, to achieve and
maintain such a balance. In many transition economies, state institutions are often
dominated or at least influenced by the financial interests of those who have gained
economically from the transition process. Distrust of state institutions appears to be
particularly strong among the private sector, i.e. the very target group that the
promotional bank approach seeks to support.
These differences in regard to the most important categories on which the promotional
bank approach depends – target group, banking system and corporate governance –
suggest that the promotional banks in the transition economies, with the possible
exception of the most advanced reforming countries, face a daunting task if their
intention is to reach a significant percentage of the target group, and especially the small
enterprises, by applying the approach as it stands. The available – albeit insufficient –
empirical evidence does not contradict this assertion. To date, promotional banks have
only gone into operation in those countries that have already reached a relativelyVII
advanced stage of the transition process. Furthermore, the SME business of these
promotional banks appears to consist primarily of lending to the larger firms within this
target group. Accordingly, they have probably done little to alleviate the credit rationing
to which micro and small enterprises are subject. And finally, the SME business does
not necessarily play the dominant role in relation to the other lines of business (e.g.
infrastructure and housing finance) which, according to the theory behind the approach,
a promotional bank may also pursue but only as a supplement to the core business of
SME support. From the standpoint of development policy, there is nothing wrong with
this shift of emphasis, given that there is an obvious need for support in these areas.
However, since the primary task of the promotional bank approach, by definition, is to
promote not only medium-sized but also small enterprises, and the financial sector as a
whole, it is questionable whether even the promotional banks that are already in
operation are actually achieving the goals for which the approach was designed.
In the hope of finding another historical precedent that might yield more useful lessons
for the design of promotional measures aimed at improving the financing situation of
the target group in a situation characterised by an emerging private sector and a banking
system in the process of being built up, the paper analyses the development of the target
group, the banking system and enterprise financing in 19th century Germany. This
analysis reveals a number of parallels with the present situation in many transition
economies: For one thing, the target group consisted mainly of micro and small
enterprises and the banking system had to evolve without recourse to previous
experiences. For another, it is found that not (only) long-term loans to finance fixed
asset investments, but (also) short-term loans to finance working capital were
appropriate services provided by commercial banks to small and medium-sized
enterprises during that phase of financial system development. And finally, the
“interventions” that took place in the German financial system of the 19th century to
improve the target group’s access to financial services were precisely not based on the
principles behind the promotional bank approach. Instead they came in the form of the
savings banks and credit co-operatives, i.e. entities that were not second-tier institutions,
were not founded as a consequence of government initiatives, and did not engage in
long-term lending, or at least only to a very limited extent. Rather, the origins and
evolution of the savings banks and credit co-operatives exhibited features which are
characteristic of the financial institution-building approach to development projects.
Every historical situation is unique. Consequently, every comparison between historical
situations is inevitably problematic. If, despite these reservations, historical comparisons
occupy such a large part of the present paper, it is because the explicit and implicit
equation of two historical situations – post-World War Two Germany and post-Cold
War Central and Eastern Europe – is a central argument put forward by the advocates of
promotional banks to justify that approach. The detailed comparative analysis presented
here comes to an unambiguous conclusion: it is inadmissible to equate the two historical
situations, especially in terms of the target group, the banking system and the corporate
governance environment, i.e. the categories that define the promotional bank approach.
Hence the comparison cannot be accepted as evidence that the promotional bankVIII
approach is a suitable instrument for improving the financing situation of small and
medium-sized private-sector enterprises in the transition economies. Before a conclusive
evaluation can be given, however, more detailed empirical analysis of the results
achieved in the transition economies to date is needed. Bearing in mind just how
important the development of the financial system and the SME sector is for the national




In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe the transition from central planning to a
market-based economic system has been underway for almost ten years now. At the start
of this process, discussion focused on the macroeconomic orientation that policy-makers
should pursue, and on the relative merits of gradual adjustment versus “shock therapy”.
In the mid-1990s, however, structural issues came to the fore. Among these “second-
generation transition issues”
1, two of the most important are the establishment of a
viable sector of small and medium-sized enterprises, and the design of an efficient
financial system.
Numerous development co-operation projects sponsored by multilateral and bilateral
organisations couple these two issues, either explicitly or implicitly, in that the projects
aim to promote the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) sector specifically by
improving their access to financing.
2 The underlying assumption on which all these
projects are based is that the financial systems in the transition economies are unable or
only partly able to satisfy SMEs’ financing needs; and that an inadequate supply of
credit for this target group forms a significant obstacle to growth and development in the
regions in which the projects operate.
One approach specifically designed to address these problems is the establishment of
“promotional banks”. On behalf of the German government, Kreditanstalt für
Wiederaufbau (KfW)
3 has supported the establishment of such banks, and aided in their
design, in a total of 13 Central and Eastern European countries to date.
4 The key feature
of KfW’s approach is that it not only acts as a consultant to the promotional banks in
question, but also draws upon its own history, mission and organisational structure as a
                                                
*) The author is head of the economic research department at Internationale Projekt Consult (IPC)
GmbH, Frankfurt, and also lectures at the University of Würzburg.
1 See: The World Bank (1995)
2  See Pissarides (1998), Rühle/Winkler (1994).
3  The department responsible is Department KSb, which belongs to the division “Promotion of the
German Economy”. The company “KfW Finanzierungsplanungs- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH”
[KfW Financing Planning and Advisory Services] was founded for the purpose of carrying out such
projects; it receives an order from GTZ to provide the technical support. KfW (via FpB GmbH) is thus
a sub-contractor to GTZ, i.e. it acts as a consultant from GTZ’s point of view.
4  KfW (1998), p. 68.2
model for the project design.
5 KfW’s principal business is the promotion of the German
SME sector through the provision of external capital on favourable terms and conditions
(in regard to interest rates, maturity, repayment of principal and premature redemption).
The aim is to compensate for a supposed weakness of financial sectors, including
Germany’s – namely, that “essentially creditworthy would-be borrowers are either
unable, or only partially able ... to meet their needs for long-term credit” (Stein/Kirchner
(1980), pp. 337f). Moreover, KfW has the reputation of being the financial institution
that made a decisive contribution to re-building (West) Germany after the Second World
War: It provided the financial resources needed to solve the problems of financing
reconstruction. If it is assumed that the task facing Central and Eastern Europe after the
end of the Cold War is the same as that which faced Germany after the Second World
War, namely, to establish a “social market economy”, then the promotional bank would
appear to be a highly appropriate instrument for achieving similar ends in the economies
of Central and Eastern Europe, judging by the empirical evidence from (West)
Germany.
The promotional bank approach is not only based on Germany’s experience with KfW
after the Second World War, however. Rather, its underlying philosophy – that banks
are an important means through which to foster economic development – is derived
from Germany’s financial and economic history over the last 200 years. The pertinent
lessons to be drawn from this history can be summed up as follows:
1. The financial system as a whole, and the banking system in particular, can make an
important contribution to the process of industrialisation and/or industrial
modernisation. A statement such as “Without the financial commitment of the major
banks, the rapid build-up of the new industries, in which Germany soon assumed a
leading position, would not have been conceivable” (Pohl, M. (1993), p. 268) sums
up the received wisdom found not only in the specialist literature on the economic
history of Germany in the second half of the 19th century, but also in many standard
history books used in secondary schools and colleges.
6
                                                
5  See KfW (1997), p. 5; the Spokesman for the Board of Management, Vogt, has spoken of this
approach as “exporting KfW’s own way of doing things”, in: FAZ, 18 May 1993, p. 17.
6  See, for example, Prokasky (1988), pp. 123f.3
2. The banks performed this “pace-setting function” (Wellhöner/Wixforth (1990), p.
12) primarily by providing financial resources in the form of long-term credit, which
served as the basis for large-scale and productive investments. Today, the provision
of long-term credit remains the predominant feature of the German banking system,
particularly when contrasted with the American and British banking systems; this
difference is underscored in the theoretical and economic-policy discussions on the
advantages and disadvantages of the respective systems.
7
3. Although the banking system thus played a highly important role in Germany’s
industrial development, the banks’ promotional efforts were restricted almost
exclusively to large-scale enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises, in
contrast, had almost no access to bank loans, whether long-term or short-term, i.e.
they were subject to credit rationing. Small savers, as well, were more likely to be
discouraged from accumulating deposits at private banks than encouraged to do so.
On the whole, from 1850 to 1914, the banking system in Germany provided
“development assistance for the strong” (Tilly (1986)).
4. It took the establishment of state and public-sector banking institutions – or, in more
general terms, financial institutions not solely obligated to pursue (short-term) profit
maximisation – to integrate small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as small
savers, into the formal financial system. Even today, on the eve of the 21
st century,
the institutions that were established at that time remain ubiquitous features of the
German banking landscape: the savings banks, the credit unions, and the agricultural
credit co-operatives.
Thus, Germans do not have any difficulty with the idea of banks functioning as
instruments to promote industrialisation processes, or with interventions in the banking
system by state or public-sector entities which have priorities other than (short-term)
profit maximisation. Based on positive experiences in Germany’s past, both notions
have positive connotations among the general public, all the more so when the
beneficiaries are small and medium-sized enterprises.
8
                                                
7 See, for example, Dewatripont/Maskin (1995), Carlin/Richthofen (1995).
8  H. A. Winkler ((1985), p. 187) refers to another specifically German experience which makes the
promotion of SMEs a key task for politicians and economic policy-makers, a task which the state has
an obligation to perform: According to this view, after global economic crisis broke out at the end of4
This predilection on the part of German observers, particularly those whose views were
shaped in large part by West Germany’s historical experiences, is often difficult for non-
Germans, particularly those from the English-speaking world, to understand. Indeed, as
regards its implications for the design of SME financing projects in Central and Eastern
Europe, they may even reject this approach out of hand.
9 Not only do Anglo-Saxons not
have the peculiarly German perspective connected with West Germany’s experiences
after the Second World War; their own financial and economic history gives them an
almost diametrically opposed view in which the undesirability of large banks in general,
and state banks in particular, is more or less a given.
10 In regard to development policy,
the poor record of state development banks in many countries since the end of the
Second World War has only served to strengthen this Anglo-Saxon conviction. For it
can be said of such banks that “with few exceptions, their performance was dismal:
lending decisions were often based on political considerations rather than on economic
criteria; loan supervision and recovery were very weak; and such innovations also
suffered from high levels of overstaffing and large overheads.” (Caprio/Vittas (1997),
p. 13)
The parallels between German reconstruction after the Second World War and the
reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold War, which appear obvious
from a (western) German viewpoint, also play only a secondary role in the Anglo-Saxon
perception. Instead, Anglo-Saxon thinking is dominated by a concept of transition
which, after decades of state ownership and operation of the economy, involves the
creation of an economy based on private entrepreneurship and the market mechanism.
Accordingly, the aim in the economies of Central and Eastern Europe must be to force
the state out of the economy, and out of the financial sector in particular. From this
perspective, proposals which aim to re-introduce the state as a direct or indirect
participant in the market, as in the case of the German promotional bank approach,
appear almost anachronistic.
                                                                                                                                              
the 1920s, the ensuing panic among the Mittelstand (Germany’s small and medium-sized businesses)
enabled National Socialism to grow into a mass movement and helped to destroy the first German
republic.
9  The author bases this statement on his own experiences in numerous conversations in connection with
designing SME financing projects in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe since
1994.
10  See remarks on this subject by Tilly (1989).5
However, the Anglo-Saxon standpoint on SME financing is also based on the
conclusion that too little credit is being extended to small and medium-sized enterprises
in transition economies; and it too regards the establishment of a viable sector of private
small and medium-sized enterprises, along with an efficiently functioning financial
sector, to be of key importance to the success of the transition process. Rather than a
promotional bank approach, however, the concept favoured in the Anglo-Saxon view is
one which builds on the principles of “institution building, commercial approach and
financial system orientation” (Pissarides (1998), p. 7). The focus is on direct
intervention at the level of the commercial banks, starting either with existing
institutions (the downscaling approach) or with the establishment of new, target group-
oriented commercial banks (the upgrading approach).
11 The whole range of instruments
available to development finance comes into play, i.e. the acquisition of equity stakes in
new or existing institutions and the exercise of the corporate governance functions
associated with such holdings; the extension of lines of credit to finance loans to the
target group; and technical assistance in various forms, e.g. management services
agreements, advisory assistance to institutions in establishing target group-oriented
credit divisions, or the design of training programmes. Examples of such projects
12
include the EBRD’s Russia Small Business Fund, KfW’s German-Ukrainian Fund,
FEFAD Bank in Albania (KfW/GTZ), Micro Enterprise Bank in Bosnia-Herzegovina
(EBRD/IFC/FMO), Microfinance Bank of Georgia (KfW) and Fundusz Micro in Poland
(USAID).
13
The following paper will present an analysis of the promotional bank approach as an
instrument of SME financing. The goal is to determine to what extent the merits of this
approach, as demonstrated in the development of the German financial system, might
also make it an appropriate instrument for the promotion of the SME sector in Central
and Eastern Europe.
14 First, the concept of a promotional bank will be explained in
                                                
11  See Krahnen/Schmidt (1994), Schmidt/Zeitinger (1994) and Holtmann/Rühle/Winkler (1999) on these
two approaches.
12  For more on the individual projects, see EBRD (1995), p. 145; Wallace (1996); German Federal
Ministry of Economics/KfW (1998), KfW (1998a) pp. 21 and 55f, Balsen, W. (1998, 1999).
13  The projects supported or initiated by KfW are managed by the division of KfW which is responsible
for carrying out financial co-operation with developing countries at the request of the German Federal
Government.
14  This methodology – examining the financial and economic history of the developed countries in order
to gain insights and derive recommendations for policies, or, as in the present case, project designs
which could be adopted in developing countries and transition economies – is particularly favoured6
detail (Section 2). This will be followed by a comprehensive analysis of the post-war
period in Germany and the role of KfW in financing small and medium-sized
enterprises (Section 3); this will serve as a means of determining the extent to which it
is valid, with regard to SME financing, to draw parallels between the post-war period in
Germany and the transition period which began in Central and Eastern Europe at the
start of the 1990s (Section 4). Next, the role of banks in the financing of enterprises in
Germany since the start of the 19th century will be discussed in detail, as a basis for
further comparison with the situation in Central and Eastern Europe (Section 5). It will
become apparent that although the public-sector nature of a promotional bank is, in fact,
an important argument that can be made against applying the KfW model in Central and
Eastern Europe, it is not by any means the decisive argument. Rather, the factor which
makes the promotional bank an ill-suited approach to improving the target group’s
access to credit in the transition economies is that the environment in which KfW
operated – and still operates –differs fundamentally from that of Central and Eastern
Europe in terms of both the strength of the financial system and the nature of the target
group.
On the other hand, however, the development of the German financial system in the
nineteenth century, and the interventions in the financial system of that time by public-
sector entities that were not geared to (short-term) profit maximisation, would seem to
indicate that promotional activities should be implemented at the level of the
commercial banks themselves. Ultimately, the question of which approach is most
suitable can only be answered conclusively on an empirical basis. Therefore, the paper
concludes (Section 6) by underscoring the need for detailed analysis of the performance
of the promotional banks founded in Central and Eastern Europe to date, and then for
comparison with the performance achieved by approaches being implemented at the
level of the commercial banks.
                                                                                                                                              
among specialists in financial system development; see, for example, Caprio/Vittas (1997),
Humphrey/Sato/Tsurumi/Vesala (1996), pp. 20f, Gorton (1985), p. 267.7
2. The Promotional Bank Approach
2.1 Rationale, Goals and Instruments
Promotional banks are an instrument of government economic-growth and structural
policy “deployed in an attempt to exploit the development potential of a market
economy to the maximum.” (Streit (1991), p. 131). The promotional bank approach is
therefore based on the assessment that a financial sector organised solely on the basis of
private enterprise cannot achieve this:
15 “The central task of a functioning financial
market is to direct the ... scarce financial resources into what are defined by economic
policy as priority areas. Even in developed market economies it has been found that this
task is not performed to a sufficient degree by the banking system. For this reason,
promotional banks have been and are being created to carry out the functions that are
not being satisfied by the central banks and the commercial banks” (KfW (1997), p. 4)
Small and medium-sized enterprises are regarded as a priority sector of the economy
because their emergence is “a decisive element in the transition to a different economic
system.” “They respond flexibly to changing market conditions and make a substantial
contribution to the creation of competitive jobs.” (KfW (1997), p. 4).
In other words, like all the other project approaches in the area of SME finance, the
promotional bank concept is based on the diagnosis that the financial system of a given
country is not capable of providing the target group with an appropriate supply of credit.
However, it differs from other approaches in that the term “appropriate” is defined very
narrowly, insofar as it is taken almost exclusively to mean the provision of long-term
finance, which is seen as a necessary precondition for the implementation of productive
investment projects:
16 “Insufficient access to long-term financing is a serious problem
for most SMEs in Central and Eastern Europe.” (KfW (1997), p. 4) As in the developed
                                                
15  The following analysis is based closely on the presentation of the promotional bank approach
published by KfW on its website (KfW (1999, HP)) under the heading “Principle”, and also on the
brochure “KfW-Förderbankenberatung” [KfW Advisory Services to Promotional Banks], (KfW
(1997)).
16  The study by Caprio/Demirgüc-Kunt (1997) contains empirical evidence to support this hypothesis.
However, the analysis also shows that the size of the productivity gains achieved through an
investment financed with long-term funds depends crucially on whether the funds are provided by the
banking system endogenously as a consequence of the market process or whether they represent an
outflow of subsidies, i.e. a result of state interventions in the financial system. If the latter is true, the
correlation between the productivity of the investments and the term structure of the loans is not only
no longer clearly positive, but in some instances even turns out to be negative.8
western economies, SMEs lack – in the absence of a promotional bank – a “secure
basis” for investment decisions, which puts them at a serious disadvantage in
competition with large companies. In this respect, promotional banks help to minimise
the “disadvantages due to company size” (Kolb (1996), Harries (1998), p. 122).
Furthermore, the reference to the “loans at favourable interest rates” which a
promotional bank is supposed to initiate implies that the credit facilities currently
available to the target group in the banking market, if any, are too expensive.
17
Private-sector commercial banks do not offer this “appropriate”, i.e. long-term, finance
either because they in turn do not have access to sufficient long-term funds, or because
long-term lending is not profitable enough by comparison with short-term lending or
other financial products. In that case, broadening a bank’s range of products to include
long-term credit to the target group would run counter to the goal of profit maximisation
which private-sector commercial banks are obliged to pursue.
The promotional bank approach addresses these constraints by offering the commercial
banks long-term funds at cheap rates, thus allowing them to offer long-term loans to the
target group on a profitable basis. It is assumed that the commercial banks have access
to a credit technology which enables them to keep the risk-related costs and transaction
costs associated with target group lending down to within acceptable limits, i.e. which
enables them to earn an interest margin which, although not unacceptably large from the
point of view of the promotional bank, is nonetheless large enough to be compatible
with the commercial banks’ profit-maximising motive.
However, this assumption cannot be made in the Central and Eastern European context:
since long-term funds are in very short supply, the banks have not yet had an
opportunity to develop an efficient long-term lending technology (KfW (1997), p. 4).
Therefore the principles underlying the classic promotional bank approach have been
modified somewhat insofar as a promotional bank in a Central or Eastern European
country is also expected to assist the local commercial banks in developing such a credit
technology in the first place.
                                                
17  In OECD economies, small and medium-sized enterprises have to pay interest rates that are between
two and five percentage points higher than large ones; see Pissarides (1998), p. 3.9
Finally, the structural and economic policy goals that can be pursued by means of a
promotional bank are not solely confined to SME development. “According to the
economic policy objectives of the government, promotional banks also finance
infrastructure investments and environmental protection measures, the privatization and
restructurization of state-owned enterprises, or housing modernization measures.” (KfW
(1999, HP)) Nonetheless, descriptions of this approach always prioritise the SME sector,
not only in the context of KfW’s domestic business in Germany, but also in connection
with the tasks of newly founded or yet-to-be founded promotional banks in Central and
Eastern Europe. Thus, on the basis of these descriptions, long-term SME finance can be
regarded as the raison d’être of a promotional bank.
2.2 Corporate Governance and Position Within the Financial System
The credit rationing faced by the target group is largely attributable to considerations of
profit maximisation on the part of the commercial banks, which make them less willing
to assume risks than would be desirable from the point of view of the economy as a
whole (Streit (1991), p. 133). It therefore follows that promotional banks should
precisely not be obliged to maximise their profits. This can only be assured if they are
majority-owned by government or public-sector entities, for only then will they be able
to function as instruments of the desired development-oriented economic policy.
Consequently, the majority of the members of a promotional bank’s board of
administration or, as the case may be, its supervisory board will be government
representatives.
The promotional bank approach is based on the subsidiarity principle: promotional
banks – in accordance with the rationale for creating them – act only to the extent
necessary to offset the market failure that has been diagnosed, i.e. in providing funds
earmarked for specific structural and economic policy aims and in setting the terms and
conditions under which those funds are to be made available. This is reflected in the fact
that promotional banks, by their very design, do not compete with commercial banks
because they function solely as second-tier institutions. As a rule, a promotional bank
will not lend directly to the target group, but will channel funds to the final borrowers
via local commercial banks and savings banks. “The intermediate banks assume the full
liability for the loans.” (KfW (1999, HP))10
The promotional bank approach is therefore confined to addressing the identified
weaknesses of the financial market which are attributed solely to the lack of long-term
funding and/or the desire of the local commercial banks to maximise their profits.
Hence, the key to alleviating or even overcoming the credit rationing faced by the target
group is to provide onlending funds on appropriate terms and conditions. If, on the other
hand, it were found that the commercial banks were neglecting the target group because
they did not have the credit technology needed to serve that clientele effectively, the
promotional bank approach would not be a suitable means of combating credit
rationing. It would be unsuitable because either the promotional bank would find itself
unable to disburse its funds, or the commercial banks would have to incur credit risks
that they were incapable of managing and controlling. Not only would this weaken the
financial system as a whole, but the promotional bank itself would get into (financial)
trouble sooner or later because its debtors, the banks, could fall into arrears as a result of
defaults on the part of their borrowers.
Because of its role as a second-tier institution, a promotional bank does not need a large
staff, nor a branch network, to issue loans to the target group – it can simply use the
human resources and the branch networks of the commercial banks. Nor does a
promotional bank pursue any particular, politically motivated projects, as its evaluation
of applications for funds will be based solely on prudent banking criteria, i.e. only on
the “economic feasibility of the measures to be financed”, not on their political
expediency. These are the characteristics which place promotional banks “– at the
interface between politics and economics – as an institution which supports the
economic policies of the government of the country in question and does so with the
flexibility and efficiency of a commercial organisation.” (KfW (1997), p. 4)
While providing cheap loanable funds to commercial banks, a promotional bank will
enjoy various government-sanctioned privileges with regard to its own funding. For one
thing, the approach implies that the promotional bank should be exempted from paying
taxes and also dividends. For another, the government should guarantee the bank’s
liabilities. The purpose of the latter arrangement is to render the promotional bank
independent of government funding, at least in the medium-to-long term. This is
necessary if only because, given the precarious situation of public finances in the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, it is the only way to ensure that the11
promotional bank has a sufficiently broad impact.
18 The promotional bank must
therefore be in a position to raise large volumes of funds on favourable terms in the
capital market. To help it to do so, the state guarantee is supposed to give the institution
the status of a good credit risk in the local capital market, even in comparison to the
privately owned commercial banks. If it were to succeed in playing a pioneering role
here which other banks were soon able to emulate, it would also have contributed to the
further development of the capital market of the country in question.
Overview 1.1 summarises the characteristics of a promotional bank’s corporate
governance structure and its position within the financial system of the country in which
it is based, as defined by the concept under discussion here. The objective of a
promotional bank is to promote small and medium-sized enterprise by providing long-
term loans at low interest rates. When designing its programmes, it adheres to a general
framework defined by government but is not bound by government directives regarding
their specific practical implementation. The implementing agencies with which it
collaborates are privately owned commercial banks which function as channelling
institutions. They allow themselves to be used as instruments because the terms on
which they are offered loanable funds by the promotional bank are sufficiently attractive
to render long-term lending to the target group compatible with their goal of profit
maximisation. The promotional bank can offer these cheap rates because it is able to
draw upon government funds and/or funds available on favourable terms and conditions
in the local or international capital markets.
                                                
18  KfW’s response is to provide the promotional banks of Central and Eastern Europe with start-up
funding for jointly developed credit programmes. This is to avoid a situation in which “the advisory
assistance fails to bear fruit or make a lasting impact due to a lack of specific opportunities to apply
the advice received and to a lack of lending practice.” (KfW (1997), p. 6).12
Overview 1.1: Main Characteristics of the Corporate Governance Structure and the
Position of a Promotional Bank Within a Country’s Financial System
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2.3 Some Remarks from the Point of View of Ordnungspolitik
Like any other government intervention in a market, the promotional bank approach,
which involves intervening in the financial markets, is open to criticism from the point
of view of Ordnungspolitik (see, for example, Streit (1991), pp. 20f).
19 This is because
the rationale for state action rests on a comparison of an unrealisable ideal allocation of
resources – in this case, all creditworthy firms receive credit – with the reality that many
firms, especially small and medium-sized ones, are subject to credit rationing.
According to this view, reality’s poor performance compared to the ideal is attributed
exclusively, or at least primarily, to the fact that the individual actions of the economic
units do not conform to the collective standard of value – or, in this specific case: the
activities of profit-maximising private commercial banks do not lead to the optimum
level of external financing from the point of view of the economy as a whole.
Practically every economics textbook contains a chapter showing that this diagnosis
does not automatically justify government intervention (see, for example, Streit (1991)).
Rather, it is first necessary to examine the causes of the “market failure”
20 in terms of
their economic implications. Especially in the area of corporate finance, key insights
have been provided by the economics of information over the past 30 years.
21 According
to this view, the establishment of external financing relationships requires the
deployment of mechanisms – signalling, screening/monitoring, self-selection – which
establish incentive compatibility between borrowers and investors. The aim here is to
avoid the problems of moral hazard or adverse selection which investors would
otherwise face on account of an asymmetrical distribution of information. The reason
why the market does not provide as much external finance as would be desirable from
the point of view of the economy as a whole is therefore that the banks do not apply
these mechanisms, possibly because they are too expensive, or because they may simply
not be available. If they are not available, it may be due to shortcomings in the legal
environment, preventing creditors from using the courts to enforce the terms of their
loan contracts (e.g. the right to seize collateral), or it may have to do with the economy’s
                                                
19  A leader in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), commenting on KfW’s 50th anniversary,
described the German promotional bank as a “foreign body in the market economy” (Krause (1998),
in: FAZ, 12.06.1998, p. 15).
20 Pissarides (1998), p. 1 describes the credit rationing experienced by small and medium-sized
enterprises as “capital market failure”.
21  For an overview, see Schmidt/Terberger (1996), Part V, pp. 376ff.14
stage of development. For example, if one accepts that reputation is an important
instrument at the disposal of the borrower for signalling incentive compatibility with the
lender (see Diamond (1989, 1991), Breuer (1995)), then it will obviously be more
difficult to reduce credit rationing in a market economy that is only just beginning to
evolve than it would be in a market economy that has existed for many years and has
stable enterprise and banking sectors.
Thus, the theory of financing rooted in the economics of information offers an
alternative explanation of the credit rationing faced by small and medium-sized
enterprises, an explanation which goes beyond the conflict between individual and
collective interests, i.e. the profit-seeking interests of private commercial banks versus
the interests of the economy of a whole. Rather, the alternative theory argues that the
failure of reality to live up to the ideal of a credit market in which all creditworthy
borrowers receive loans at a uniform interest rate is due to a complex set of external
factors which lead to credit rationing. These external factors, characterised by
asymmetric information distribution, cause the market participants to incur transaction
costs and information acquisition costs which cannot be eliminated or reduced until the
commercial banks have developed appropriate technologies. This view casts the
commercial banks in a role that is diametrically opposed to that which they play in the
diagnosis on which the promotional bank approach is based. Rather than seeing them as
the cause of credit rationing on account of their desire to maximise profits, the
alternative view regards commercial banks as the most important instrument available
for solving credit rationing problems.
At the same time, account also needs to be taken of the problem that governments will
not necessarily be capable of correcting market imperfections. Governments themselves
are obviously not perfect, and when considering the promotional bank approach, or
indeed any other government intervention, the “costs and inherent laws of (economic)
policymaking and political action” (Streit (1991), p. 21) need to be factored into the
equation. This can mean that intervention produces even worse results than if the market
were left to its own devices. Therefore it is necessary to ascertain whether, and under
what conditions, a promotional bank can operate “efficiently and flexibly”, i.e. under
what conditions the intervention would cause no adverse side effects, or at least only
minor ones, and would thus be preferable to the market solution.15
In response to these fundamental concerns about government interventions into market
mechanisms, two arguments can be put forward in defence of the promotional bank
approach:
1. The subsidiarity principle: As long as it merely provides loanable funds to the
commercial banking system and refrains from lending directly to the target group,
the promotional bank will not be competing with commercial banks – for asset-side
business, at least – but supporting them. In this respect it could be argued that
despite the privileges granted to a promotional bank and despite its public-sector
status, it represents a form of government intervention that conforms to, rather than
conflicts with, market forces.
2. KfW as a model: In terms of their objectives, corporate governance and position
within the financial system, promotional banks are supposed to be modelled on
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau itself, which was founded in 1948 in order to ensure
that the GARIOA
22 funds were deployed efficiently. There is nothing in the post-war
history of KfW and the West German banking system to indicate that the actual
development, to which the promotional bank, i.e. KfW, contributed, was any worse
than what could have been achieved by a financial system that had relied solely on
the market and private initiative.
To clarify whether there is any empirical evidence to back up the objections of principle
which could be raised against the promotional bank concept, it therefore makes sense to
start by asking whether KfW actually followed the promotional bank approach in
practice, and if so, on what basis.
                                                
22  GARIOA = Government and Relief in Occupied Areas.16
3. KfW: From a Bank for Reconstruction to a Promotional Bank
3.1 The Positioning of KfW in the West German Financial System
Judging by the literature
23 on the history of KfW, the free-market concerns, although
based entirely on theoretical considerations, were and are evidently of considerable
practical importance. The publication of the “13 Principles for the Reconstruction Loan
Corporation” on 12 June 1948 immediately sparked off a discussion about whether the
establishment of a central funding institution for the reconstruction of Germany should
not be seen as state-subsidised, and thus unfair, competition for the commercial banks.
24
The problem was that the channelling principle which is central to the concept of a
promotional bank was not firmly embedded in the initial proposals, which seemed
instead to imply that the new institution would have an unconditional right to lend
directly to enterprises. There was therefore a danger that – for example, if commercial
banks refused to bear prior liability for a loan to an enterprise on account of insufficient
security – KfW would step in with a direct loan, thus entering into direct competition
with the commercial banks but with a distinct advantage over them thanks to its
privileged position on the funding side. Instead of subsidiarity, KfW’s effect would then
have been to substitute itself for the commercial banks, i.e. instead of stimulating
lending activities under market conditions, it would have made commercial lending
more difficult, if not impossible.
But by the time the Law Concerning the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau was passed on 5
November 1948, these objections had been taken into account in several respects:
25
- First-tier lending was limited to exceptional cases which require the approval of the
Board of Directors;
                                                
23  The following account was based on the studies by Pohl, M. (1973) and Harries (1998). Harries
worked for KfW for 35 years, and served on the Board of Management from 1986 to1996.
24  See Pohl, M. (1973), p. 23, p. 26, and Harries (1998), pp. 14f. In light of the discussion on the
potential role of promotional banks in Central and Eastern Europe it is remarkable to note that even as
long ago as 1947/48 the American authorities took a critical view of a central financial institution for
the reconstruction of Germany. It was not until the British pointed out that the Americans themselves
had founded their own “Reconstruction Finance Corporation” in Washington in 1932 in the wake of
the Great Depression that the U.S. authorities were persuaded to approve the new institution (see
Harries (1998), pp. 8ff).
25  Harries ((1998), p. 12) points out that, once again, the influence of the Americans was far from
insignificant.17
- Short-term loans could only be made with the approval of the Bank deutscher
Länder, the forerunner of the Bundesbank;
- the state guarantee on KfW’s liabilities was limited to interest payments;
- KfW was forbidden to operate branches.
This last provision at least prevented KfW from extending bank loans directly to small
and medium-sized enterprises on a cost-covering basis, which would have necessitated a
much larger staff and a sizeable branch network. Furthermore, the Law made it clear
that the economic justification for KfW’s activities was to provide commercial banks
with long-term funding that was to be channelled into reconstruction projects, funds to
which the commercial banks had little or no access (Pohl, M. (1973), p. 27).
Nonetheless, during the early years another conflict arose between KfW and the
commercial banks, this time on the liability side. It was precipitated by KfW’s plans to
issue its first two bonds in the capital market, purchasers of which were also to enjoy tax
concessions.
26 The representatives of the banks and savings banks on KfW’s Board of
Directors voted against the issue of both bonds because they again feared unfair
competition from KfW for their own institutions on account of its privileges and the
additional tax advantages.
27 When it came to a vote on the bond which was to be issued
to finance manufacturing industry, this view was shared by exactly half of the members
of the Board of Directors. The tie had to be broken by the casting vote of the chairman,
who decided in favour of the bond (Pohl, M. (1973), pp. 65ff).
Generally speaking, though, “in setting up KfW Germany had acquired a central
reconstruction financing instrument that exhibited none of the characteristics of a
commercial bank.” (Pohl, M. (1973), p. 36) However, another reason why the
relationship between KfW and the commercial banks was largely free from tension was
that, in its early years, KfW mainly engaged in the kinds of business that the commercial
banks were unable or unwilling to take on themselves.
                                                
26  In the end, only the housing bond carried a tax concession.
27  Concerns of this kind were voiced as an issue of principle even before KfW was founded; see Pohl, M.
(1973), p. 37.18
3.2 1948–1971: KfW as a Bank for Reconstruction
Analysis of KfW’s lending activities in its first few years of operation reveals two things:
first, it operated only to a limited extent as a promotional bank; and second, small
enterprises were of virtually no significance as a target group. In the late 1940s and early
50s, KfW saw its main task in “issuing loans to the primary industries, such as coal, iron
and steel, gas, water and electricity... Only later were loans to the other industries
considered.” (Pohl, M. (1973), p. 47) Although direct loans were originally intended to
be the exception, in fact they became almost the rule for KfW, especially in its lending to
the energy industries and coal mines, as the firms that operated in these sectors were not
regarded as bankable by the commercial banks on the grounds that their documentation
was incomplete (Harries (1998), p. 41). Given the sectors involved (see also Table 3.1)
and KfW’s small staff, it is hardly surprising that the recipients of these loans were
almost exclusively large firms (Pohl, M. (1973), p. 55). Harries ((1998), p. 27) describes
KfW’s activities in those first few years as “a small team making big deals”.
The figures for the industrial programmes suggest that here too it was the upper end of
the medium-sized enterprise sector rather than the lower end of the small business sector
that received finance. For example, under the first tranche of the ECA
28 in 1950 “some
581 enterprises received a total amount of DM 234 million” (Pohl, M. (1973), p. 62),
which works out at an average loan amount of about DM 400,000. The planning for the
third ECA tranche included “the remainder of the industrial sector... 485 different firms
from all industries with a combined credit volume of more than DM 763 million.” (Pohl,
M. (1973), p. 89), meaning that the average amount was DM 1.57 million.
Lending to small enterprises accounted for no more than a tiny fraction of KfW’s
business. In the context of the Job Creation and Investment Programme, with a total
volume of DM 496.89 million, a mere DM 90.91 million was issued in the form of small
loans to craft enterprises, small businesses and small-scale trade and industry (Pohl, M.
(1973), pp. 204f.). Of the DM 1.12 billion loaned by KfW to manufacturing industry and
shipbuilding up to 1953, just DM 54 million went to small and medium-sized industry
(Harries (1998), p. 44). It is interesting to note that this amount was extended as a
blanket loan to Industriekreditbank, IKB, implying that when it came to SME finance,
KfW did not exercise its “right and duty not only to assess the creditworthiness of the
                                                
28  ECA = Economic Commission Administration.19
liable bank, but each individual client.” (Pohl, M. (1973), p. 32)
29 By 31 December 1953
KfW had lent a total of DM 162.2 million to craft enterprises and other small businesses,
including the blanket loan to IKB; this accounts for just under 3% of its total lending
volume (Pohl, M. (1973), p. 225).
In 1952 KfW launched its first SME programme with a volume of DM 24 million, and
from 1955 on KfW shifted its promotional lending increasingly from primary industry to
manufacturing industry, trade and craft enterprises (KfW (1997a), p. 8). It became clear
that both the banks and the target group first needed to be persuaded to use these funds:
“Long-term loans have to be particularly carefully vetted and secured. Given the fairly
small average credit amounts at this time of only DM 35,000, some banks often
considered their profit margin, as prescribed by the KfW, insufficient. Only slowly did
the realisation spread that the KfW’s credit programmes for the SME sector were quite
an attractive financing alternative for small firms and their house banks, especially as
they could be redeemed prematurely at any time in spite of the fixed rates of interest. It
was not until after 1958 that the KfW achieved a sizeable loan commitment volume of
more than DM 100 million per year in its SME programmes.”
30
However, it was not until 1971 that programmes were initiated that fully embraced the
promotional bank concept described in section 2, i.e. programmes for which KfW raised
funds in the capital market which it lent to commercial banks on inexpensive terms so
that they in turn could onlend to small and medium-sized enterprises at prescribed rates
(Harries (1998), p. 220). The volume of funds committed annually rose from DM 500
million in 1971 to DM 6 billion in 1989 (Harries (1998), p. 122). It was at this point that
KfW definitively ceased to be a bank for reconstruction and became West Germany’s
promotional bank.
For the purposes of comparing KfW as Germany’s promotional bank with the
promotional banks of Central and Eastern Europe, the first conclusion that can be drawn
                                                
29  That micro and small loans cannot be issued by a centralised organisation with a small staff of highly
specialised personnel operating without a branch network was also evident in the agricultural sector:
“The further distribution of the loans to the final borrowers was performed directly by these credit
institutions, or by their regional and local affiliates. KfW had no option but to apply this procedure
because of the wide dispersion and fragmentation of the loans into small and very small amounts.”
(Pohl, M. (1973), p. 63; a similar account is given by Harries (1998), p. 42).
30  Harries (1998), p. 57; on the problems of putting the promotional bank approach into practice in
Germany, see also Pohl, M. (1973), pp. 48f.20
is therefore the following: even if 1955 is defined as the year in which KfW started to
promote small and medium-sized enterprises, the conditions that prevailed in Germany
at that time were no longer comparable with those which obtain in economies that are
striving to catch up with the West or struggling to make the transition to a market-based
system.
31 This is especially true of the situation of the target group and the banking
system, i.e. the key factors underlying the promotional bank approach. Very soon KfW
was able to work with a re-established SME sector and a functioning banking system
within a stable macroeconomic environment.
3.3 Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in the Federal Republic of
Germany: A New Beginning Based on a Long-Standing Tradition
When people today think of Germany in the immediate post-war period, the pictures and
associations that come to mind – as a result of either personal experience or what they
have learned at school, from history books or from TV – suggest that a completely fresh
start was made in 1945. The collapse had been total, not only of the political system but
also of the country’s economy: factories, infrastructure and housing destroyed, shortages
of consumer goods and primary products, a worthless currency, and an economic system
that, after 12 years’ of Nazi rule, six of them under wartime conditions, was increasingly
dominated by the state. As far as the economy was concerned, the new era began in
1948, encapsulated in such terms as currency reform, social market economy and
economic miracle.
                                                
31 In 1955 per capita income in West Germany had already risen above the levels recorded for the
German Reich in 1938 (see Buchheim, C. (1997), p. 87).21





































































































































































































Source of basic data: Federal Statistical Office
This view of the situation, correct though it is as far as it goes, nonetheless conceals the
fact that there was not only collapse but also continuity. One important aspect of22
continuity was the survival of numerous enterprises. According to Table 3.1 there were
2.1 million firms in West Germany in 1950 with an average of 6.69 employees each.
Despite the wave of new business starts following World War II – which is discussed in
more detail below – it is hardly likely that all, or even most, of these firms were starting
completely from scratch. The relatively high average number of employees per enterprise
is in itself an indication of this.
32 Hence, the majority of these firms will already have
been in existence prior to 1939.
33
Table 3.1 also shows that in the three dominant sectors – manufacturing, trade and
services – average firm size, measured in numbers of employees, was already growing
in the 1950s and 60s, a basic trend which indicated that the enterprise sector was
enjoying stable development. In contrast, the figures for the energy, water and mining
sectors underscore the structural change that has taken place in Germany over the past
50 years.
As already mentioned, Germany experienced a wave of business starts in 1945, as large
numbers of local citizens and ethnic Germans expelled from the former German
territories of Eastern Europe tried to build a new life for themselves (see Schierenbeck
(1991), p. 76). The evolution of these enterprises is particularly interesting because they
can be regarded as prototypes of the enterprises that were set up in Central and Eastern
Europe after 1989. The statistics show that “two thirds of the new firms that were set up
after the war disappeared again after only a few years.” (Schierenbeck (1991), p. 76)
Many failed because they were unable to come to terms with the hard budget constraints
that were imposed with the advent of the new currency, the D-mark, and also because,
after years of working in what had been a more or less centrally planned economy, they
                                                
32  Since 1850 there has been a steady upward trend in the size of companies in Germany. In 1850 there
were 1.5 – 1.7 employees per firm, in 1895 1.9, in 1939 3.3 and in 1972 7.6; see Fischer (1976), p.
557.
33  As far as craft enterprises are concerned, this assertion is supported by the following empirical
evidence: in the area that became West Germany (the old Länder, excluding Saarland and West
Berlin) there were 792,079 craft enterprises (“Handwerksbetriebe”) in 1939; 11 years later, in 1950,
864,429 craft enterprises were counted in the same area (see Winkler, H. A. (1985), p. 189). The
figure for 1950 includes subsidiary craft enterprises (“handwerkliche Nebenbetriebe”) and a number of
trades that were not counted as “Handwerk” in 1939.
Just how many of the firms recorded in 1950 must have existed before 1933 and therefore had
experience of a free market economy can be deduced from the following statistics: 20%, i.e. rather
more than 15,000 of the 72,000 firms stored in the database maintained by the firm Kompass in 1999
(!) were founded between 1750 and 1933.23
were stuck in a way of thinking that emphasised the technical aspects and intrinsic
values of products but was short on commercial expertise. “The outcome of the phase
immediately preceding and following the currency reform could be described as follows:
Although the young companies were initially able to earn high sales revenues with their
‘ersatz’ and ‘utility’ products, they failed to make a name for themselves and were
unable to withstand the competition from the established brand-name articles. The
decisions of many of the young entrepreneurs were influenced by rather dangerous
aspects of mass psychology. They lacked a solid grounding in business management.”
(Schierenbeck (1991), p. 78)
These figures are useful as a means of comparing the respective operating environments
faced by the promotional bank KfW and the promotional banks of Central and Eastern
Europe. They suggest that if in the period 1948–1959 KfW had geared its activities
primarily to the target group of newly established businesses, it could have got itself and
– to the extent that commercial banks might have been involved in this lending business
– the banking system as a whole into serious financial trouble, especially if it had
concentrated on long-term loans. As it turned out, however, KfW started in the mid-
1950s to concentrate on promoting an SME sector in which most of the firms, i.e.
potential borrowers, had already been operating in a market environment for years or
even decades and whose “institutional memory” was clearly oriented towards the market
economy. Thus the risk of lending to SMEs, either for KfW or for commercial banks,
was never so great as to make it impossible to achieve the goal of long-term lending on
the basis of the promotional bank approach.
Box: KfW as a Promotional Bank in the New Länder of eastern Germany
This review of the post-war years may be interesting from a historical point of view, but
one could argue that it is comparatively irrelevant to an analysis of whether the
promotional bank approach is suitable for Central and Eastern Europe today. Yet while
it would be fair to point out that in the post-war period KfW was operating only to a
very limited extent as a promotional bank, this objection would certainly not apply to its
role in the new Länder of eastern Germany. Between 1990 and 1997, KfW funded
107,000 loans to the target group, with a commitment volume of DM 46.4 billion (KfW
(1998), p. 28). And regardless of how valid one believes a comparison between post-war
West Germany and the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe to be, there
is no denying the fact that the situation in eastern Germany at the start of the 1990s was24
more similar to that of other Central and Eastern European states than was the situation
in West Germany after World War Two.

















1991 292,997 27,207 138,009 99,767 12,109 48,091
1992 214,316 9,820 22,366 98,822 120,768 3,398 11,028 62,316
1993 190,032 8,663 20,630 85,767 119,557 2,938 11,351 60,757
1994 170,782 8,976 19,838 74,068 119,300 3,377 12,573 59,251
1995 170,204 10,508 19,493 73,373 131,187 4,577 15,232 65,262
Source: Federal Statistical Office
This is especially true of small and medium-sized enterprises, which, apart from some
150,000 private craft enterprises, manufacturing and service businesses that already
existed in eastern Germany when it was still the GDR (Giese (1995), p. 505), could only
have emerged after 1990. Table 3.2 gives an indication of the development of this sector
over the period 1991–1995 based on the number of companies registering for the first
time and on those deregistering.
Clearly, as in post-war West Germany, the first two years after German unification saw
new businesses mushroom, especially in the trade and the hotel and catering sectors.
However, also like their counterparts in post-war West Germany, only some of the new
businesses proved capable of surviving. Thus, while the number of new registrations
tended to decline in the first half of the mid-1990s, there was a steady rise in the number
of firms deregistering. In 1995 the net increase in the number of firms based in the new
Länder was only 40,000, as against nearly 200,000 back in 1991.
At the same time, there was a rise in the incidence of insolvency proceedings and the
total volume of claims filed in connection with these proceedings (see Table 3.3). In25
1995 the claims against firms in the new Länder and Berlin amounted to over DM 8.9
billion, or 38.5% of all claims registered against enterprises and self-employed
professionals in the Federal Republic as a whole.
Table 3.3: Number of Insolvency Proceedings and Total Claims Filed Against
Companies and Self-Employed Professionals in the New Länder









* incl. Berlin (West)
Source: Federal Statistical Office, Fachserie 2, Reihe 4.1 and Reihe 4.2
Germany’s commercial banks fuelled the start-up boom in the new Länder with credit,
much of it with special funds, provided in particular by KfW.
34 But there can be no
doubt that KfW’s promotional activities would not have been possible if the West
German banks had not been so swift to move into eastern Germany. This was crucial for
the first two eastern German SME programmes launched by KfW in February and July
1990 – and indeed, not only for those two: “Both programmes had to be routed through
banks. The rapid construction of the banking industry in East Germany ensured a quick
start for these programmes.” (Harries (1998), p. 165)
Eventually, though, more and more SMEs experienced problems servicing their loans
from commercial banks. Thus, every year since 1994 the Bundesbank’s annual analysis
of the earnings situation of German credit institutions has mentioned considerable
writedowns at the eastern German banks, presumably caused by defaults on the part of
the large number of “young enterprises” that borrowed from them.
35 As a consequence,
                                                
34  See Giese (1995), p. 506.
35  See Bundesbank (1995), p. 29, Bundesbank (1996), p. 40, Bundesbank (1997), p. 46 and Bundesbank
(1998), p. 41.26
commercial banks began to be more and more restrictive in their lending to the SME
sector. Various officials of professional associations and political representatives of the
SME lobby criticised this business policy, which they interpreted as unjustified credit
rationing on the part of the banks. Against the background of the arguments put forward
by the advocates of the promotional bank approach for Eastern Europe, it is interesting
to note that KfW itself rejected these criticisms and defended the commercial banks
against the charge of unfair discrimination (Harries (1998), p. 174).
Ultimately, the rediscounting institutions were also affected by the economic difficulties
of eastern Germany’s SME sector. Between 1994 and 1997 “write-downs of and value
adjustments on loans and certain securities and increase of allowances for possible loan
losses” which KfW had to undertake rose by 127%, while claims against customers
increased by only 28% during the same period, and total assets by only 8.6%. Although
the 1997 Annual Report makes no explicit mention of regional differences, the trend
among eastern German SMEs suggests that when the Notes on the Financial Statements
speak of “the higher risks to the bank on domestic SME finance and on equity finance
with venture capital” (KfW (1998), p. 96) which necessitate higher provisioning, they
are referring in particular to KfW’s investments in eastern Germany.
Thus, according to the figures and statements issued by the German banking system, in
these days of economic and institutional renewal, lending to the target group in eastern
Germany is clearly a relatively risky business. Yet the banking and financial system of
the Federal Republic of Germany was and is strong enough to absorb these risks. For
one thing, SME business is far from being the most important activity of Germany’s
banks; for another, business in other areas has been good over the past few years, driven
not least of all by the steady downward trend of interest rates since 1994. Another
reason why the level of risk in the SME business is relatively limited is that over the
past ten years a massive transfer of personnel and know-how from West to East has
taken place. To borrow from the terminology of development finance, the eastern
German banking system has been on the receiving end of a vast array of development
policy instruments: Both the downscaling and the upgrading approaches to financial
institution building have been pursued – in the shape of training programmes, on-the-job
training, the appointment of western German management staff, and the introduction of
western German corporate governance structures, either through takeovers of existing27
institutions (e.g. the savings banks)
36 or through the aggressive expansion of branch
networks (private commercial banks)
37. In other words, the formerly West German
banking industry has implemented a huge technical assistance programme for the
eastern German banking system.
Thus, in the reconstruction of the eastern Länder, the enlarged Federal Republic of
Germany is now benefiting for the second time from a long tradition of banking and a
body of experience which it has built up continuously since the early 19th century. Yet
whereas in Germany there is a banking system strong enough to organise the building of
a commercial banking sector in the former GDR on its own, in the other Central and
Eastern European countries no such banking system existed.
3.4 The Financial and Banking System of the Federal Republic of Germany:
A New Beginning Based on a Long-Standing Tradition
Continuity amid change after 1945 characterised not only the enterprise sector but also
the German banking system. Table 3.4 shows clearly that although there were fewer
private commercial banks, co-operative banks and savings banks in 1950 than in 1939,
it would be misleading to say that after 1945 the institutions that made up German
banking sector had to be rebuilt from the ground up.
38 Indeed, the number of employees
in the banking system rose during this period by roughly 10%.
                                                
36  See Giese (1995), p. 505
37  See N.N. (1992), p. 358.
38  Even the breakup of the big banks, which took place on the orders of the American authorities, was
reversed in 1957; see Pohl, M. (1983), pp. 231 ff28
Table 3.4: Changes Within the Western German Banking Sector 1939–1950
in Terms of No. of Workplaces and Employees
Categories of
banks No. of workplaces No. of employees


















banks 274 295 +21 +5 5,547 8,952 +3,405 +2,278
Private-sector
banks 1,849 1,723 -126 +7 33,684 39,916 +6,232 +3,456
Co-operative




234 274 +40 +6 7556 10,423 +2,867 +3,079
Savings banks 4,044 3,647 -397 -2 36,619 36,802 +243 -350





15,827 14,125 -1,702 111,193 125,802 +14,609 +9,687
Source: Essenwein-Rothe, I. (1959), p. 58
The “institutional memory” of the banking sector was even better endowed than that of
the enterprise sector – many banks can trace their activities back to the second half of
the 19th century. Indeed, if one includes the private bankers who played a major role in
the founding of joint stock banks during the 1870s, the traditions go back even further,
some as far as the early 19th century (see Pohl, H. (1982) and Pohl, M. (1982, 1982a)).
The post-war West German banking system not only emerged from a long and for the
most part market-oriented process of development, but was also immediately in a
position to provide financial services to enterprises throughout the country, as Table 3.5
shows.29
Table 3.5: Workplaces and Employees in the Financial and Banking Sector on
the Territory of the Federal Republic of Germany as of 13 Sept. 1950
Workplaces Employees
Länder of the Federal
Republic
total in % per 10,000
inhabitants
total in % per 10,000
inhabitants
Schleswig-Holstein 982 7.0 3.3 6258 4.9 24.1
Hamburg 499 3.5 3.1 8213 6.5 51.5
Bremen 106 0.8 1.9 2445 1.9 43.8
Lower Saxony 2188 15.5 3.2 14787 11.7 21.6
North Rhine-Westfalia 2746 19.5 2.1 29371 23.1 22.2
Hesse 1002 7.1 2.3 14133 11.2 32.7
Rhineland-Palatinate 924 6.6 3.1 7832 6.2 26.1
Bavaria 2463 17.5 2.7 22942 18.1 25.1
Baden-Württemberg 3180 22.5 4.9 20787 16.4 32.1
14090 100.0 3.0 126768 100.0 26.5
Source: Essenwein-Rothe, I. (1959), p. 60.
Immediately after the currency reform, the banks started lending to firms and private
individuals again – hesitantly at first, but increasing steadily as the years went by. As
Fig. 3.1 shows, the total volume of outstanding loans issued by the banking system to
enterprises and private individuals grew continuously throughout the period 1950–1971
from 21% to 65% of gross domestic product.
39
                                                
39  During this period, loans to enterprises and private individuals as a share of the combined total assets
of the banking system fluctuated within the narrow band of 51–57%.30
Whereas initially – not least because of the macro- and microeconomic risks associated
with Germany’s political and economic renewal – most loans were short-term, by 1955
the volume of long-term loans relative to total lending volume had already overtaken
that of short-term loans (see Fig. 3.2).
40 The volume of long-term loans continued to rise
in relative terms until 1960, when it settled at around 60% of total lending.
                                                
40  Until 1968 loans with an agreed term of under 6 months were regarded as short-term. Loans with
maturities of between 6 months and 4 years were medium-term and loans with terms of 4 years upward
were classified as long-term. After 1968 the threshold for short-term loans was extended to one year,
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Fig. 3.1: Outstanding Volume of Loans to Enterprises






Source of Basic Data: Deutsche Bundesbank, Federal Statistical Office
ford1-e31
That the German banking system was efficient in its lending operations can be deduced
from the differential between lending and borrowing interest rates.
41 As Fig. 3.3 shows,
the differential between loan and deposit interest rates never exceeded 7.5 percentage
points, even if the (low) rate of interest on savings deposits with statutory notice periods
is taken as the representative deposit interest rate.
42
                                                
41  On the validity of interest rate differentials as an indicator of efficiency, see Johnston/Pazarbasioglu
(1995).
42  It should be pointed out that until 1967 the commercial banks’ loan and deposit interest rates were tied
to the rates set by the Bundesbank. Nonetheless, the interest rate differential can still be seen as an
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Fig 3.2: Short, Medium and Long-Term Loans in Relation to
             Total Outstanding Volume of Loans to






Source of Basic Data: Deutsche Bundesbank
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The figures and trends presented above tell us nothing about the extent to which small
and medium-sized enterprises had access to long-term loans prior to 1971. Hence they
also give no indication of whether and to what extent KfW, in the role it assumed in the
West German banking system from 1971 on, namely as a promotional bank, helped to
counteract a market failure with regard to the financing of SMEs. However, what the
analysis does show is that the German commercial banks, thanks to their (lending)
experience acquired in a market-based economic environment, were already in the first
few years after the currency reform an important source of finance, in both quantitative
and also qualitative terms, for the German enterprise sector as a whole. Corporate
lending in general and also long-term corporate lending were already successful and
profitable businesses for the banks in 1955, and all the more so in 1971.
Accordingly, the analysis shows that the development of the West German financial
system and the example of KfW cannot be cited as empirical evidence to support the
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expertise they require in order to engage in long-term lending. The German commercial
banks had developed the capacity for long-term lending to enterprises long before KfW
started to provide funding for long-term loans to small and medium-sized enterprises on
a significant scale. KfW may have promoted long-term lending to the target group, but
it did not promote long-term lending as such, since at that time the commercial banks
were already issuing long-term loans and applying the appropriate technology as a
matter of routine.
3.5 KfW’s Corporate Governance Structure
One of the criticisms levelled against the promotional bank approach is that the state, as
the main or indeed the sole owner of the bank, may influence its operations to such an
extent that decisions are no longer based (solely) on banking criteria but are dominated
by considerations of political expediency or, in the worst case, motivated by the desire
for personal gain, i.e. there is a danger that the bank’s policies will be determined by
corruption and nepotism. This criticism is founded in the problems that have been
encountered at development banks all over the world, as mentioned in the introduction
(The World Bank (1989), pp. 67ff).
Advocates of the promotional bank approach counter this argument by pointing out that,
while this problem may be endemic to development banks, promotional banks are
immune to it because they generally function merely as a provider of funds to the private
commercial banks and it is the latter institutions which bear liability for the loans. As
described above, however, the present-day promotional bank KfW has in the past – and
particularly during its first few years of operation – also acted as a direct lender on a
large scale. And those who favour the promotional bank approach are openly willing to
concede that the promotional banks of Central and Eastern Europe will also be forced to
resort to the instrument of direct lending, especially during the start-up phase.
Nonetheless, they take the view that it will be possible to prevent abuses of the system,
and thus the ultimate failure of the approach, provided that the right people are
appointed to the supervisory bodies, including representatives not only of the
government but also of other institutions, including some from the private sector. The
corporate governance structure of the institution, as defined in the respective act of
parliament establishing the bank and in its charter, is therefore seen as a decisive factor
for success.34
These considerations also played an important part in the founding and development of
KfW. As mentioned earlier, the Law Concerning the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
delineated the institution’s functions by making the “13 Principles” more specific. Also
noteworthy in this context are the following provisions of the Law and KfW’s charter:
- Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Law stipulates that the Chairman of the Board of
Directors and his Deputy must be “personalities with special experience in financial
affairs”.
- According to the version of the Law dated 5 November 1948, the Board of Directors
was to be composed of, alongside the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, three
representatives of central government (initially the Economic Council, then, once the
Federal Republic had been established, the Federal Government), three
representatives of the Länder, one representative of the Bank deutscher Länder, three
representatives of trade unions, four representatives from the banking sector and one
representative from each of the following sectors: industry, agriculture, craft/skilled
trades and housing. Given that the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, “personalities
with special experience in financial affairs” came from the banking industry, this
meant that the representatives of the shareholders – the Federal Government and the
Länder – were in a minority on this supervisory body. Moreover, the (private)
enterprise sector and the commercial banks had a built-in majority insofar as the vote
of the Chairman counted double in the event of a tie. Although these allocations of
power are, for the most part, of little practical relevance insofar as an effort is
generally made to reach decisions by consensus, the governance structure, at least at
a formal level – i.e. as defined in the first KfW Law and the Charter – does not give
any indication that the institution was state-dominated.
The key factor behind the success of KfW as a bank for reconstruction – and in this the
two frequently cited authors of KfW’s history are in agreement (Pohl, M. (1973), pp.
18ff, Harries (1998), pp. 18ff) – was not so much the formal terms on which it was
founded, but rather the outstanding personalities of the individuals appointed as
Chairman and Deputy Chairman, namely Dr Otto Schniewind and Hermann J. Abs.
Both were without a doubt “personalities with special experience in financial affairs”,
who before taking up their posts at KfW had for much (Dr Otto Schniewind) or indeed
all (Herman J. Abs) of their professional lives held executive positions at large
commercial banks.35
Yet bankers exercised a dominant influence not only through their chairmanship of the
Board of Directors but also, and indeed, especially on the Board of Management. Article
6 of the KfW Law allowed the Board of Directors to appoint one of its members to the
Board of Management, and on the basis of this clause, dubbed “Lex Abs”, Hermann J.
Abs was called to serve on that executive body, thereby becoming the “key figure in the
allocation of funds” (Pohl, M. (1973), p. 45) during KfW’s earliest years. Abs
repeatedly insisted, both to the commercial banks and to the government,
43 that KfW
loans should be executed through the banks. Thus, he was unmoved by complaints from
the banks against the “strict rules applied by KW in cases where the final borrowers or
the banks defaulted on their loans” (Pohl, M. (1973), p. 49). Furthermore, he took the
standpoint that a limit on the liability of the commercial banks should be granted only in
those cases “in which the final borrower could theoretically be regarded as eligible to
issue securities”, as he was aware of the moral hazard problem facing KfW if it agreed
to cover (part of) the (credit) risk, namely that “individual banks would be overly
generous in their lending” (Pohl, M. (1973), p. 49). It was again Abs who rejected calls
for Industriekreditbank to have a monopoly as the channelling institution for KfW’s
industrial loans. “He also wanted other credit institutions to be involved, leaving the
choice up to the final borrower. At the same time, he was against giving
Industriekreditbank the exclusive right to perform credit analysis.” (Pohl, M. (1973), p.
48).
Thus it was – not exclusively but in particular – thanks to Abs’ personal qualities that
KfW succeeded in maintaining the balance between state ownership and sound banking
practice that it was designed to achieve, not only in its operations but also in the basic
thrust of its business policies towards its main partners, namely the government and the
commercial banks. Abs “was able to prevent the KfW from encroaching on the territory
of the still dismembered big commercial banks – e.g. from acting as principal banker to
the large public sector of the economy, as the Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft had done up to
the end of the war to the annoyance of the major banks. He was in a position to ensure
that the KfW kept within its limits as he saw them. On the other hand, his influence on
the private banking sector also helped the KfW to market its credit and its bonds on the
                                                
43  Even before they were appointed to KfW’s Board of Directors, both Dr Schniewind and Hermann J.
Abs had demonstrated that they were strongly averse to attempts by politicians to sway banking policy,
and were willing to resign rather than bow to political pressure. Shortly before joining KfW’s Board
they had turned down offers to lead the Bank deutscher Länder because they failed to win for the
ruling council of the Bank the right to veto loans to the public sector (see Pohl, M. (1973), pp. 21f, and
Harries (1998), p. 20).36
liabilities side of the balance sheet. Much convincing had to be done in both cases in the
beginning.” (Harries (1998), p. 20).
Whereas political influence on KfW’s operations, especially in the initial years, was
relatively minor, both formally and in terms of substance,
44 it increased steadily as time
progressed, at least at the formal level. The amendment of the KfW Law, passed at the
end of 1951, already shifted the balance of power on the Board of Directors: the Federal
Government, the Länder and, for the first time also the municipalities, could now
designate a total of 11 members, as opposed to the previous six, while the number of
representatives from the banking industry and the (private) enterprise sector was raised
by only one, from eight to nine, so that they now accounted for only one third of the
Board’s membership.
45 The dominance of the political sphere is also reflected in the fact
that, since 1973, the current Federal Minister of Finance has automatically been named
Chairman of the Board of Directors. In response to a critical enquiry as to whether this
arrangement was in accordance with the terms of Article 7, sentence 7 of the KfW Law,
the then Minister of Finance Helmut Schmidt remarked “that, as the head of the Money
and Credit department at the ministry, he was ipso facto particularly experienced in the
banking field – an approach which all his successors were happy to adopt.”
46
Did these changes turn KfW into an institution whose operations are no longer
conducted according to sound banking principles? The empirical evidence suggests that
it did not.
47 However, the history of KfW shows that an evolution in that direction
cannot be eliminated through laws and statutes but only by the individuals actively
involved, be they politicians, bankers or representatives of particular interest groups
within the economy. That Helmut Schmidt and his successors to the office of finance
minister were, are and will be chairmen of KfW’s Board of Directors, and not – as in the
                                                
44  Harries (1998), p. 44, implies that this could by no means have been taken for granted; otherwise he
would hardly have thought it necessary to state that “No clear priorities are discernible... in the
financing of manufacturing industry between 1949 and 1953; hence it must be assumed that funds
tended to be allocated fairly indiscriminately – a practice that is particularly prevalent whenever
political pressure distorts the policy priorities.”
45  In 1997, 17 of the 35 members of the Board of Directors were delegates from local, regional or
Federal government bodies, while the (private) business sector and the banks each held seven seats and
the trade unions four.
46  Harries (1973), p. 109. Harries also mentions other developments that subjected KfW to increased
political pressure during the 1970s.
47 Harries speaks of a “harmonious balance” (Harries (1998), p. 110) between the public-sector
shareholders and sound banking practice.37
1950s and 60s – qualified bankers, is of relatively little consequence for KfW’s business
operations as long as it conducts most of its transactions through the banking system and
as long as the politicians, represented by the finance minister, adhere to this principle.
But whether this remains the case depends on the willingness of politicians to continue
along this road; it cannot be guaranteed by the wording of the institution’s charter or by
legislation: “It must be remembered that key questions, such as subsidiarity, the public
interest in the context of financing or the KfW’s relationship with commercial banks,
can be regulated only imperfectly through legal concepts. More important is close and
constructive collaboration between the German government, the KfW and the
commercial banks in keeping with the particular needs of the epoch.” (Harries (1998), p.
16)
The lesson to be learned from KfW’s history is therefore that laws, articles and
regulations cannot in themselves be regarded as the decisive factors in ensuring that a
promotional bank is able to successfully pursue its allotted tasks. It is therefore
necessary to examine whether in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe the
promotional bank approach can offer ways, independently from the setting of formal
parameters, of ensuring “close and constructive co-operation” between the government,
the promotional bank and the commercial banks of those countries based on the
subsidiarity principle.
3.6 Lessons from KfW’s History for the Promotional Bank Approach in Central
and Eastern Europe
Analysis of KfW’s history indicates that if one’s aim is to demonstrate that the
promotional bank approach can be applied successfully in an economy that is
undergoing a phase of reconstruction, then KfW itself is not necessarily an appropriate
example to take. It should be remembered that during the actual reconstruction phase –
i.e. the years 1949–1959 – KfW’s main activity was not the promotion of small and
medium-sized enterprises but the financing of primary industry, housing and
infrastructure projects, i.e. the kind of business which, according to the theory behind
the promotional bank approach, should be a mere adjunct to the institution’s core
business, SME finance. Moreover, much of the financing was provided in the form of
direct loans. In other words, KfW was successful as a bank for reconstruction despite
the fact that it neither lent predominantly to small and medium-sized enterprises, nor did38
it mainly channel funds via commercial banks to the final borrowers, i.e. despite the fact
that it did not actually apply the promotional bank approach at all.
In the mid-1950s KfW began to operate as promotional bank for SMEs. Its lending was
limited at first, and it had to overcome considerable resistance on the part of the
commercial banks. It was not until 1971 that the activities of an ideal-typical
promotional bank became KfW’s core business, which they have remained ever since.
By 1971, however, both the SME sector and the banking system were operating again in
established structures whose origins in Germany can be traced well into the second half
of the 19th century. These structures had developed endogenously under market
conditions, interrupted only by the First World War and the Nazi era. Many of the small
and medium-sized enterprises that emerged after World War II could therefore look
back on a long tradition, and thus had considerable experience of operating in a market
environment and also a sizeable core of experienced personnel. In a qualitative sense,
the picture was the same in the banking sector, which also very quickly resumed its
traditional role, namely as a provider of (long-term) corporate finance.
In the Federal Republic of Germany, KfW did not assume the role of a promotional
bank until mature market conditions prevailed in the SME and financial sectors. In other
words, the main problem which the promotional bank approach is designed to address –
the difficulty experienced by SMEs in gaining access to long-term loans from the
commercial banks in order to be able to compete with the large firms – was the only one
that remained to be solved by the time KfW became a promotional bank in the classic
sense. In the Federal Republic of the early 1970s, many of the other typical obstacles to
SME finance did not exist, or no longer existed. Against this stable background in the
enterprise and financial sectors, changes in KfW’s corporate governance structure were
largely irrelevant.
When the Berlin Wall came down and KfW became a promotional bank for eastern
German enterprises, it was again able to operate through a stable, well-established
financial and banking system. The West German commercial banks had very rapidly
established themselves in the new Länder and had engineered a huge transfer of know-
how and capital. Even under these favourable conditions, however, many of the newly
established firms in the east found themselves in a precarious situation soon after 1990,
and their problems were reflected in the balance sheets of the banks that had lent to
them, and of the second-tier institutions that had provided the funds. In this respect, the39
example of the Germany’s eastern Länder may perhaps serve as an indication of the
scale of the difficulties confronting the promotional bank approach in the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe where no such banking system exists.40
4. SMEs, Banks and Enterprise Financing in Transition Economies
4.1 Promotional Banks in the Transition Economies: How Their Market
Environment Differs from the Environment in which KfW Operated
in Post-war West Germany
The key argument that is advanced to demonstrate the suitability of the promotional
bank approach as a means of overcoming the credit rationing to which SMEs are subject
in Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States is that empirical
evidence can be cited to show that KfW has performed this function in the Federal
Republic of Germany. However, the discussion presented in the preceding chapter
showed that KfW did not really begin to serve as a promotional bank in the strict sense
until fairly late in the game, and specifically that it hardly ever assumed this role during
the years 1948–1959, i.e. during the immediate post-war period. Thus, in West Germany
the concept of the promotional bank did not have a chance to prove its practical worth
until after the post-war period of change and transition – especially for the enterprise
sector and the banking sector – was largely over.
Nonetheless, it is important to look closely at the situation faced by Germany after 1945
(or, as the case may be, after 1948), and that of the Central and Eastern European
countries and the NIS after 1989, to see what they have in common and how they differ.
Even a superficial comparison shows that, especially if the focus is on economic
aspects, there are more differences than similarities. Indeed, “unlike the situation in
Western Europe in 1947/48, Eastern Europe is not faced with the consequences of
wartime devastation, but rather with the results of a process involving the destruction of
the foundations of economic activity over a period of at least 35 years, and in some
cases 70 years. People there were not forced to do without a market economy for ten
years; for Eastern Europeans, the market economy is a completely unknown system
whose workings have never even been described to them.” (Hahn (1992), p. 756)
In Germany after the Second World War, large parts of a stock of real capital that had
been created under the conditions of a market economy had been physically destroyed.
By contrast, in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989 the stock of
real capital that had been accumulated under a system of central planning, while perhaps
outdated, was still physically intact. However, the citizens of states bordering on the EU
were the only people in this large group of countries who might still have known
something about a market-based system and the institutions needed to make it function.41
In post-war Germany, though, the older generation, i.e. those over 40, could draw on
their own experience acquired prior to 1933 in a market economy, and were familiar
with the workings of the institutions that underpin a market system.
A classification of the individual transition economies in terms of the level of economic
development they achieved prior to the Second World War underscores the significance
of this difference in terms of countries’ historical exposure to and experience with a
market-based system. For example, the “Visegrad countries” – i.e. the Czech and the
Slovak Republics, Poland and Hungary – and also Slovenia and Croatia were all once
part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and later, either as independent states or as parts
of Yugoslavia, they all underwent a process of development quite similar to that
experienced by Germany. But this was not true, or true to only a very limited degree, of
the countries of Southeastern Europe and Ukraine, Russia and the other CIS countries.
48
This institutional and economic heritage is also one of the factors which can be cited to
explain why, ten years after the initiation of the transition process, a comparison of the
individual countries’ progress and successes in reforming their economic systems yields
a clear ranking along regional lines (see EBRD (1998), p. 29, and Fig. 4.1). If the
relative degree of progress is measured with the help of a reform index based primarily
on “soft” institutional factors,
49 the Visegrad countries and Slovenia and Croatia have
travelled the farthest along a road that is seen as eventually leading to the creation of a
proper market economy, while the former Soviet republics in Central Asia still have the
longest way to go.
                                                
48 According to Borchardt ((1984), p. 75), these differing national levels of development have their
origins in pre-industrial times. He finds evidence of considerable differences in pre-industrial Europe
between the “comparatively advanced countries of the North-west, the Mediterranean countries which
had once been the most advanced but had in the meantime become relatively backward, and the
relatively undeveloped countries in the East”.
49  In addition to the share of gross domestic product generated by the private sector, the index draws on
qualitative assessments of the progress made in the reform of enterprises, markets and trade, and the
financial-sector reform; see EBRD (1998), pp. 26f.42
Fig. 4.1: The Transition to a Market Economy: How Countries and Regions
Compare
Source: EBRD (1998), p. 29
These regional differences are important because an assessment of the promotional-bank
approach must not only take into account the many fundamental ways in which the
economic and institutional environment found in the transition economies in 1989
differed from the one that existed in West Germany in 1948. It is also essential to bear
these differences, highlighted by the above chart, in mind as they have significant
implications for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises and of
commercial banks – two sectors that are of central importance for this approach.
4.2 Characteristics of the Private Small and Medium Enterprise Sector in
Transition Economies
The transition process which began in 1989 gave the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe and the states which were to emerge from the Soviet Union an opportunity to
officially permit, and indeed encourage, private economic initiative for the first time in
decades. Table 4.1 shows the progress that has been made in “re-privatising” economic
activity in the former socialist countries since 1989, as measured by the share of gross
domestic product generated in the private sector.
The growth of the private sector in these countries over the last ten years has had two
sources: the privatisation of former state-owned enterprises and the creation of new
businesses. Although the focus in the initial period following the end of communism
was almost exclusively on efforts to privatise and restructure the state-owned firms,43
today it is clear that the private sector in transition economies consists primarily of new
enterprises, i.e. ones founded since 1989.
50 This is why the vast majority of the private
enterprises operating in transition economies are small and micro enterprises, as is
underscored by the data on the size distribution of registered enterprises (see Table 4.2).







Bosnia and Herzegovina na 35
Bulgaria 7.2 50
Croatia 8.5 55



















Source: EBRD (1993), pp. 62f; EBRD (1998), p. 26
                                                
50  See EBRD (1995), p. 139. This is due not least to the fact that while it proved possible to rapidly
privatise small medium-sized state enterprises, the number of such enterprises was relatively small,
given the preference for large-scale economic units which was characteristic of central planning. The
privatisation of large enterprises turned out to be considerably more difficult than the transfer of
smaller operations to private ownership, and this continues to be the case.44
Table 4.2: Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Selected Transition Economies
Small and medium-sized enterprises: breakdown by number of employees Country Number of registered



















































































































Small and medium-sized enterprises: breakdown by number of employees Country Number of registered




























































































































Small and medium-sized enterprises: breakdown by number of employees Country Number of registered














































































































Small and medium-sized enterprises: breakdown by number of employees Country Number of registered











































































Source:   UN (1996, 1999)48
Although caution must be exercised when interpreting the statistics compiled in the
various countries, the overall pattern is unambiguous: the share of the total number of
SMEs (defined as enterprises with fewer than 100 employees) which is accounted for by
micro and small enterprises ranges between 90 and 95 percent, and in some countries it
even exceeds 95 percent. These figures are confirmed by the results of other
investigations.
51 The proportion of micro enterprises, i.e. businesses with 0 – 9
employees, is seldom lower than 70 percent, and in the more advanced countries, where
it can be assumed that statistics are more accurate, shares of up to 96 percent (Hungary)
are reported.
In addition to formally registered enterprises, the private sector in most countries also
includes a large number of businesses that operate informally as well as sole
proprietorships (one-man or one-woman businesses). The available data on such
businesses show that there are up to eight times as many economic units of this type
than there are officially registered businesses which have the status of autonomous legal
entities (UN (1996), pp. 23f.).
52 Moreover, large informal sectors consisting of one-
person businesses are found not only in the less advanced economies; informal
economic activities also account for a sizeable share of total output in the countries that
have made more progress in the transition to a true market economy. Thus, for example,
in the mid-1990s in Hungary the informal sector contributed 26 percent of GDP, while
in Estonia informal businesses accounted for 35 percent of all private economic activity
(EBRD (1995), p. 140). And based on the experience of Latin American countries, it
can be assumed that in recent years the share of the total workforce that is employed in
the informal sector has tended to increase rather than decrease in a number of the
transition economies – namely, those that have had to contend with serious
macroeconomic instability and/or financial crises and the resulting adverse impacts on
the level of real economic activity.
The sectoral distribution of activities also exhibits a clear pattern across the entire range
of countries, with trade and service businesses accounting for the lion’s share of all
SMEs and manufacturing enterprises usually making up significantly less than 30
                                                
51  See, for example, the overview in EBRD (1995), pp. 147ff. Studies conducted by the author and his
colleagues since 1993 in Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakstan,
Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine for KfW, EBRD and IFC confirm the accuracy of the
figures drawn from the literature which are cited in the following.
52  See also Borish/Noel (1996).49
percent of the total.
53 And while the nature and relative importance of the various
economic activities undertaken in the SME sector is fairly predictable insofar as one
finds a roughly similar breakdown in almost every country, conditions at the level of the
individual enterprise are rather unstable. Indeed, enterprises enter and leave its
component markets so often and so quickly that national statistical offices are frequently
unable to maintain accurate records on the status of registered businesses: For example,
an EBRD survey of Bulgarian SMEs in 1995 found that “only 20 per cent of registered
private enterprises in manufacturing were active, while the rest had gone bankrupt,
relocated, changed their activities, or had never operated as enterprises, ...” (EBRD
(1995), p. 140). The young businesses that make up the SME sector also frequently
switch from one product or service to another, and it is not uncommon for entrepreneurs
who exit one market to try their luck in a completely different line of business. In
addition, a single enterprise will often engage in various kinds of activities in various
sectors (EBRD (1995), p. 141).
Thus, as can be seen from the above discussion of the essential characteristics of the
SME sector in the transition economies, it is quite unlike the small and medium
enterprise sector that existed in West Germany after the Second World War. Of course,
there is one obvious way in which it is similar to the SME sector in post-war West
Germany: small and medium-sized businesses in the transition countries are now faced
with the task of accumulating a stock of capital, as were Germany’s small and medium
enterprises after the war. But in Germany most SMEs were able to acquire the capital
they needed by supplying goods and services in markets in which ways of doing
business and the “rules of the game” were long established, having been shaped – and
institutionalised – by a society that had historically encouraged free enterprise and
individual economic initiative. Moreover, businesses in post-war Germany had the
advantage of being able to operate in an overall economic environment that was
relatively well known to them and also relatively stable. By contrast, the SMEs in the
transition economies are operating in societies which have not yet developed or
established generally recognised rules and “traditions” for the conduct of business
activities. And they are also faced with an overall economic environment which is new
to them and is also very unstable as well. Thus, even if the transition economies had
financial systems which were as experienced in dealing with the private sector as was
West Germany’s financial system after the war, they still might not be any better off.
                                                
53  See UN (1996), pp. 29f.50
Indeed, it is doubtful whether even a relatively advanced and sophisticated financial
system like the one with which Germany rebuilt its economy would have the specific
tools and capabilities needed to make small and medium enterprise lending a
commercially viable undertaking in a typical transition economy.
54 And, as will be
shown in the following section, financial and banking systems of this type do not exist
in the transition countries.
4.3 The Banking System in the Transition Economies
The banks in post-war West Germany had a long history of operating in an environment
shaped by the mechanisms, institutions and assumptions characteristic of a market
economy, and as they entered the new era after the currency reform of 1948 they could
draw upon a large number of credit relationships that had been built up within such an
environment. However, the situation in the transition economies in the years 1989–1991
was quite different: in the former communist countries, financial institutions either had
to be started from scratch after 40 (or 70) years of central planning (this was the case
with private commercial banks) or had to be given a completely new role (this was the
case with the state-owned banks). Unlike the situation in West Germany during the post-
war period, the task facing the transition economies was thus “to create a functioning
financial system where none had existed before.” (EBRD (1998), p. 92).
By and large, the state banks that existed in almost every former communist country at
the beginning of the transition process were specialised banks that had been set up when
the old monobank, which was a characteristic feature of Soviet-style central planning,
was dismantled with a view to creating a two-tiered banking system. How quickly such
institutions were established after the formal end of the communist regime was a
function of the commitment to economic reform shown by national governments. It is
fair to say, though, that in the period prior to the initiation of reforms geared to
restructuring the economies of the region and moving towards a market-oriented system,
the economic function of these banks remained largely the same as it had been when
they were divisions of the old monobank. They continued to be responsible solely for
monitoring and directing the payment flows between enterprises and for mobilising the
                                                
54  This is an important constraint that was highlighted by Caprio/Summers in a relatively early
contribution to the literature; see Caprio/Summers (1993), p. 9.51
savings of private households. Under central planning, it was neither necessary nor
feasible for banks to endeavour to guide the allocation of resources in such a way as to
maximise the efficiency of their use, which is of course the principal function of
financial systems in western market economies. Thus, as the former communist
countries embarked upon their journey from central planning to a market-based system,
their state-owned financial institutions were almost completely unequipped for the tasks
they would face as the economic environment changed. Specifically, they had had
almost no experience in assessing and managing credit risk, the use of loan security,
credit monitoring and the other key elements of financial intermediation.
55
Some transition economies responded to the challenge of creating a new banking system
by adopting a laissez-faire policy in the area of bank licensing. Thus, for example,
during the initial phase of the transition to a market-oriented system in the former Soviet
Union a large number of new banks were licensed (see Table 4.3). At first such
institutions were established by large state-owned enterprises, but soon private
enterprises also began to set up banks. In most cases, though, these banks were not
really intended to engage in financial intermediation. Rather, they were created in order
to permit their owners to exploit the advantages offered by the “financial repression”
which characterised the workings of the financial systems of most, if not all, of the
former communist countries at the time; specifically, these banks were used to allow
their owners to borrow at strongly negative real interest rates.
56 Hence, these institutions
also went into business without having acquired the tools and skills needed to analyse
the creditworthiness of enterprises. And this meant that even if the banks in transition
economies had been interested in catering to the credit demand of small and medium
enterprises (and most of them were not, given their intended functions and the
prevailing macroeconomic conditions), they would have drawn the (false) conclusion
that lending to SMEs would entail both excessively high costs and inordinately high
risks, and thus that it would not make sense for them to try to serve this target group.
                                                
55 On this point, see also Gelb/Honohan (1991) and Caprio (1995), p. 263.
56 The World Bank called these institutions “agent banks”, while using the term “channel banks” for the
state-owned institutions. See The World Bank (1993).52
Table 4.3: Number of Banks Operating in Selected Transition Economies
(figures in brackets show the number of majority foreign-owned
institutions)
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997
Belarus 48(na) 42(1) 38(1) 38(2)
Bulgaria 40(1) 41(3) 42(3) 28(7)
Croatia 50(na) 54(1) 57(4) 61(7)
Czech Republic 47(13) 45(13) 44(14) 41(15)
Estonia 22(1) 18(4) 15(3) 12(3)
Macedonia 6(3) 6(3) 8(3) 9(3)
Hungary 43(17) 42(21) 41(25) 41(30)
Kazakstan 184(6) 130(6) 101(9) 82(22)
Latvia 56(na) 42(11) 35(14) 32(15)
Lithuania 22(0) 12(0) 12(3) 11(4)
Poland 82(11) 81(18) 81(25) 83(29)
Russia Na 2295(19) 2029(23) 1697(26)
Slovak Republic 19(4) 25(9) 24(9) 25(9)
Slovenia 44(6) 41(6) 36(4) 34(4)
Ukraine 228(1) 230(1) 229(6) 227(12)
Source: EBRD (1998), pp. 154 – 197.
With the advent of stabilisation programmes, which were designed and implemented
with external support (the efforts of the IMF and the World Bank played a key role
here), a hard monetary budget constraint was introduced, entailing a shift to positive real
interest rates – in some cases, extremely high positive real interest rates. This hard
budget constraint supplanted the soft constraint that had previously been in effect, and
thus the days of negative, and in some cases very strongly negative, real interest rates
were over. However, the emergence of positive real rates confronted most banks,
whether state-owned or private, with extremely difficult, and in some cases insoluble,
problems in their lending business with enterprises. Most notably, it meant that if banks’
operations in this area were to be viable, they would now have to be able to accurately
assess the creditworthiness of enterprises before issuing loans to them.
57 By and large,
they turned out to be incapable of carrying out sound credit analyses, and in many
                                                
57  As regards Russia, see Winkler (1995), Winkler (1996).53
transition economies the majority of banks are still unable to adequately assess credit
risks, as is shown by the high arrears rates computed by the EBRD for selected national
banking systems:
Table 4.4: Non-performing Bank Loans in Selected Transition Economies
(computed as a percentage of total outstanding loans in the banking
system)
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997
Belarus 8.4 11.8 14.2 12.7
Bulgaria 6.8 12.6 14.6 12.9
Croatia 12.2 12.9 10.7 9.8
Czech Republic 34.0 33.3 30.0 28.8
Estonia 3.5 2.4 2.0 2.1
Macedonia na na 42.8 35.6
Hungary 17.6 10.3 7.2 3.6
Kazakstan na 14.9 19.9 7.7
Latvia 11.0 19.0 20.0 10.0
Lithuania 27.0 16.7 32.2 28.3
Poland 28.7 20.9 13.2 10.4
Russia na 5.9 5.1 3.5
Slovak Republic 30.3 41.3 31.8 33.4
Slovenia 22.0 13.2 14.3 12.3
Ukraine 5 13 12 11
Source: EBRD (1998), pp. 154 – 197, p. 133
With non-performing loans ranging between 10 and 30 percent of their portfolios, “banks
in transition economies have not been able to generate significant profits from customer
loans” (EBRD (1998), p. vii) – despite the fact that spreads between deposit and lending
rates in many countries significantly exceed the differentials found in market economies
with comparable per capita income levels (see Fig. 4.2).54
Fig. 4.2: Spread Between Deposit and Lending Rates in Selected
Transition Economies and Per Capita Income Level
Source: EBRD (1998), p. 95
The large losses incurred by commercial banks when they attempted to engage in
financial intermediation by lending to private sector entities, in conjunction with
substantial, in some cases extreme, levels of macroeconomic instability, have led to
financial and banking crises in many transition economies in recent years (see EBRD
(1998), p. 100, and Pissarides (1998), p. 2). In some countries it turned out that as much
as 40 percent of the total assets of the banking system were worthless.
In view of the problems and constraints outlined in the preceding discussion, it is not
surprising that in the transition economies the volume of bank lending not only to SMEs,
but to the private sector as a whole, is very small. And even if allowance is made for the
low per capita income levels found in most former communist countries, the extent of55
bank lending to the private sector is still shown to be much lower for the transition
economies as a group than it is for market economies (see Fig. 4.3).
58
Fig. 4.3: Bank Loans as a Percentage of Gross National Product
in Relation to Per Capita Income Levels
Source: EBRD (1998), p. 94
Instead of financing the private sector, the banks in many transition economies are
increasingly focusing on financing the public sector, i.e. treasury bills account for a
large percentage of their total assets.
59 Not only SMEs but the entire private sector is
subject to credit rationing, and not only long-term but even short-term loans are not (or
no longer) being offered by the banking systems of transition economies.
                                                
58  The positive correlation between per capita income and various indicators of the level of financial
system development, e.g. the relationship between M2 and GDP or that between credit to the private
sector and GDP, is a “stylised fact” derived from recent empirical research on the nature and origins
of economic growth; see, for example, King/Levine (1993).
59 See Borish/Noel (1996), EBRD (1998), p. vii and p. 94, and Winkler (1996, 1998).56
In general, an analysis of the banking systems of the transition economies points to the
conclusion that not only do the financial systems and the commercial banks fail to
satisfy the needs of the target group, but that there is effectively no financial system, or
at best one that is only just starting to develop. Only in the countries whose reform
programmes have come furthest, e.g. the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, might
one possibly describe the shortage of long-term funds as being a major problem facing
the financial system. In other countries, the financial institutions are struggling even to
provide short-term loans to finance working capital (see Pissarides (1998), p. 4 and p.
17, EBRD (1998), p. 128).
 60
Thus, if SMEs are the victims of credit rationing in these countries, this cannot be
attributed to profit maximisation motives on the part of commercial banks which give
large firms precedence over the target group, and offer them more favourable maturities
and interest rates. In this respect, the initial situation in most of the transition economies
is different from the one which the promotional bank approach was designed to
overcome. Therefore, the commercial banks are not likely to relax their restrictive
lending policies towards the target group just because a state-owned, non-profit-
maximising institution, i.e. a promotional bank, provides earmarked funds via various
credit programmes. On the contrary, the type of credit rationing that is currently being
experienced in the transition economies is due to the inability of the banks to apply
mechanisms for creating incentive compatibility between borrowers and lenders. In
other words: what is missing is a credit technology that would be appropriate to the
radically changing circumstances in the transition economies.
The reality of Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS contrasts starkly not only with the
ideal environment for a promotional bank but also with the situation of the West
German financial system up to 1971, the year in which KfW began to function as an
SME-oriented promotional bank on a large scale. In other words, there is little in West
Germany’s post-war history, an era which was, moreover, characterised by
macroeconomic and financial stability, that would seem, a priori, to justify the choice of
KfW as a model for projects aimed at improving the financing situation of SMEs in
Central and Eastern Europe.
                                                
60 Private micro, small and medium-sized enterprises must therefore rely primarily on internal financing;
see Cornelli/Portes/Schaffer (1996).57
4.4 Corporate Governance
Promotional banks are state institutions. The state provides the equity, its
representatives – normally – have a large majority on the supervisory board, the
members of the management board are appointed at least partly on political grounds or
are (former) politicians themselves. Nonetheless, these institutions are not supposed to
base their (lending) decisions on political considerations but solely on banking criteria,
as stipulated in the laws governing their establishment and in their respective charters.
However, the history of KfW itself has shown that it is not so much the formal founding
documents but rather the motives and incentives of the main actors which determine the
course that a promotional bank will take, i.e. whether it will actually perform the tasks
assigned to it or whether it tries to establish itself as an “old style” state development
bank.
To try to examine the motives and incentives of the individuals responsible for the
running the 13 promotional bank projects in the transition economies would not only be
impossible but also futile. For one thing, no member of a supervisory or management
board would make official statements contradicting the principles contained in the laws
and charters of the institution he or she represents; for another, even if it were possible
to analyse the personalities of the individuals concerned based on their previous records,
this would still not yield any reliable information on how they react when faced with
specific credit decisions. In the transition economies, finding local “personalities with
special experience in financial affairs” is inherently impossible because no comparable
financial system existed prior to 1989. Most of the leading figures, not only those who
(are supposed to) carry responsibility at the promotional banks, have either come to
prominence somehow under the old system and/or were brought to the fore by the
upheavals themselves.
Accordingly, the question whether present conditions in Central and Eastern Europe
make it appear likely that the delicate balance which promotional banks must keep in
order to be successful – the balance between their political mission on the one hand and
the execution of that mission according to sound banking principles on the other – can
only be approached via an analysis of the characteristics of those countries’ state sectors58
in general.
61 And on this basis, the answer is an unambiguous No: “Many states of the
region face extremely low levels of public confidence and trust, thus undermining their
authority to establish institutions that effectively alter the behaviours and practices of
the population.” (EBRD (1998), p. 23).
The few economic winners of the transition process are increasingly taking advantage of
this institutional vacuum by using the state machinery to further or protect their financial
interests. This has led to the creation of a “policy-making environment characterised by
the capture of the state by powerful economic interests, discretionary intervention by
state bureaucrats into the market and high levels of corruption. In this environment, the
state has been unable to finance itself ... to enforce hard budget constraints on
enterprises, to promote good corporate governance or to maintain investor and popular
confidence in the market.” (ibid.)
Despite official claims to the contrary, these developments are also and indeed
particularly impacting on the financial sector; in many countries the state is still using its
influence on the commercial banks, even the privately owned institutions, “to continue
extending credit to loss-making enterprises.” (ibid.) In this environment, which is
particularly characteristic of Southeastern Europe and the NIS,
62 it seems illusory to
expect that those in charge of a state-owned promotional bank will be better able to
withstand this pressure than the non-state commercial banks merely because of the
wording of the respective Law or the promotional bank’s charter.
63
However, even if one assumed, for now, that such an expectation were not unrealistic,
the success of a promotional bank would also depend on the extent to which the target
group were willing to believe in the impartiality of this new state institution. After all,
they would be presenting their loan application, and the attached documents, not only to
the commercial bank but also to the promotional bank. Again, the question of whether
                                                
61 In many transition economies, and especially in the CIS, the general legislation – the body of laws and
directives – is applied and enforced only to a limited extent; see EBRD (1998), pp. 39ff.
62 See Brunnetti/Kisunko/Weder (1997a)
63  The author is anxious to point out that this remark is not meant to suggest that all individuals in
responsible positions in the countries concerned are corrupt or willing to accept bribes. Rather, the
remarks reflect the general experience that in an environment in which corruption and nepotism are
rife, very few people will be able to succeed in standing up to external pressure and behaving in a
manner contrary to general expectations.59
the target group would trust the new institution cannot be answered specifically for
promotional banks, but only for state institutions in general. Table 4.5 contains the
results of a worldwide survey of private enterprises in which they were asked to rank the
problems they faced in order of the degree to which those problems disrupted or
obstructed their activities. The survey revealed that corruption and political instability
are seen as crucial problems in Central Europe and the NIS, whereas in the developed
economies of the West they play only a minor role (see shaded areas of Table 4.5).
Table 4.5: The 15 Most Serious Obstacles to Business Activities Faced by Private

























11 1 1 12 5 3 1
Corruption 2 2 8 3 31 1 2 6
Financing 3 3 4 2 6 6 4 4 8
Inadequate supply of
infrastructure
45 7 5 93 2 1 2
Crime and theft 5 4 9 6 4 4 3 14 11
Inflation 6 6 12 4 8 4 7 8 3
General uncertainty on
costs of regulations
78 6 8 55 9 6 7
Political instability 8 7 11 7 22 6 7 1 2
Labour relations 9 10 2 10 13 13 8 10 4
Regulations on foreign
trade (imports/exports)
1 0 91 0 1 3 7 91 051 0
Safety or environmental
regulations
11 12 3 11 15 12 11 12 13
Regulations for starting
business/new
12 13 5 12 11 13 12 9 5
Foreign currency
regulations
13 11 13 13 10 10 13 13 9
Price controls 14 14 14 15 12 14 15 11 14
Terrorism 15 15 15 14 14 15 14 14 15
Source: Brunetti/Kisunko/Weder (1997), p. 6060
On closer analysis, the results also indicate that the rankings of the individual problems
in Central Europe and especially in the NIS exhibit greater similarities with those of
developing countries (Southern Africa, Latin America/Caribbean, Middle East/North
Africa) than with those of the developed economies or Asia/Southeast Asia.
64 To
demonstrate this point, let it be assumed that the rankings may be defined as
significantly different if the private sector of one group of countries ranks a given
problem more than three places higher or lower than that of another group of countries.
According to this classification, the differences between the transition economies and
those of the developed countries are generally larger than those between the transition
economies and the developing countries (see Table 4.6).
Yet it is not only in quantitative terms that the problems perceived by the private sector
in the transition economies are more closely comparable to those in developing
countries than in the developed world. The results presented in Table 4.6 indicate that
the differences between the transition economies and the developed countries or the
countries of Southern and Southeast Asia are primarily associated with the role of the
state in the economy. In transition economies, corruption and political instability are two
manifestations of the weakness of the state which are seen as urgent problems. In
contrast, government regulations which in developed economies are felt by the private
sector to be restrictive – labour relations, safety and environmental standards,
regulations on starting a business – are regarded as less of a problem in transition
economies, either because such regulations do not exist at all or, if they do, they are not
(indeed, cannot be) enforced, or can easily be circumvented. This is, of course, another
manifestation of the weakness of the state.
                                                
64  Through many discussions with government officials, bankers and academics in transition economies,
the author has found that people in the reforming countries of Central and Eastern Europe resent their
situation being likened to that of developing countries. Therefore, it should be emphasised that to
compare the two sets of countries here is in no sense to deny that huge differences exist between them
in terms of human capital, industrialisation and technological advance.61
Table 4.6: No. and Type of Priority Differences (more than 3 rankings) between
CEE/NIS and Other Groups of Countries




(Corruption, inflation, political instability,
labour relations, safety or environmental
regulations, regulations for starting
business/new)
7
(Corruption, crime and theft, inflation,
political instability, labour relations,
safety or environmental regulations,
regulations on starting business/new)
Southern Africa 3
(Financing, political instability,
regulations on foreign trade)
2







(Taxation, inadequate supply of
infrastructure, general uncertainty on costs
of regulations, political instability, labour





(Inadequate supply of infrastructure,
crime, inflation, regulations on foreign
trade, price controls)
3
(Inadequate supply of infrastructure,




(Financing, crime and theft, political
instability, labour relations, regulations on
starting business/new, foreign currency
regulations)
6
(Inadequate supply of infrastructure,
crime and theft, inflation, political
instability, labour relations, regulations on
starting business/new)
Source: Own compilation based on Brunetti/Kisunko/Weder (1997), p. 60
When comparing the CEE/NIS countries with developing country groups, in contrast,
the main difference that stands out is in the respective perceptions of the category
“inadequate infrastructure”, which is seen by the private sector in developing countries,
but not in the transition economies, as a major obstacle to development. This indicates
the relevance of the remarks made at the start of this section on the stock of real capital
that was built up over the last decades in Central and Eastern Europe and has not been
destroyed. In other words, the infrastructure is there to be used, largely independently of
the type of economic system. However, aside from this difference between transition
economies and developing countries, which is immediately obvious to any observer and
is confirmed by the private sectors of the respective countries, the analysis reinforces the
view that in regard to the private sector’s assessment of the categories relating to the
state and its actions the transition economies, and especially the NIS, are closer to the
developing countries than to the developed countries.62
All in all, therefore, we can conclude that the promotional banks in Central and Eastern
Europe have to operate mainly in an environment which, particularly in terms of the
ability and willingness of the state and its institutions to adhere to its own laws and
regulations, is similar to that which prevails in developing countries. This gives grounds
to doubt that the appropriate design of laws and charters, or of internal working and
decision-making procedures, will in itself be enough to prevent promotional banks from
suffering the same fate as most development banks, i.e. to prevent lending policies from
being determined by political and/or personal interests rather than by sound banking
criteria.
4.5 Summary of the Differences Between the Transition Economies and the
Federal Republic of Germany as Environments for the Implementation
of the Promotional Bank Approach
A comparative analysis of the situation in post-war Germany with that of the transition
economies after the end of the Cold War allows the following conclusions to be drawn
regarding the target group, the banking system and the conditions for corporate
governance of state-owned or public-sector institutions, all of which are key to the
success of the promotional bank approach (see Overview 4.1).
The stylised comparison shows that there is a danger that the promotional banks in the
transition economies will prove incapable of operating on the basis of the approach
described in section 2 of this paper for the following reasons:
- The vast majority of the target group consists of businesses so small that – as with
KfW in the immediate post-war period – lending to small businesses organised
through and also controlled by the promotional banks would involve excessively
high transaction costs. This would prompt the promotional banks to focus on the
upper end of the target group, which would mean that only a tiny percentage of the
total number of SMEs would be reached.
- The commercial banks lack the technology needed to lend to the private sector at
their own risk, i.e. to assume liability for the loans on behalf of the promotional
banks. If the transaction costs and the – as the banks see it – higher risk of lending to
the smaller firms in particular are factored into the calculations, it is also doubtful
whether the differential between the cost of the funds received from the promotional63
bank and the lending interest rate the commercial banks are allowed to charge on
loans to final borrowers will be sufficiently large to persuade the commercial banks
that lending to the target group is a worthwhile venture.
Overview 4.1: Comparison Between Post-1945 Germany and Post-1989 Central
and Eastern Europe in Terms of the Key Categories for the
Promotional Bank Approach: Target Group, Banking System and
Corporate Governance
Category West Germany Central and Eastern Europe
Target group: Private small and
medium-sized enterprises
For the most part, established,
relatively large firms with
experience of operating in a
market-based economy under hard
budget constraints
Almost exclusively newly formed
(very) small firms, or older larger
firms, but with no experience of
operating in a market-based
economy under hard budget
constraints
Banking system Almost exclusively, established
financial institutions with
experience of (short- and long-
term) lending to (known)




founded, mostly small privately
owned banks, or old, large,
formerly state-owned commercial
banks with little or no knowledge
of lending practices and which,
furthermore, have to cater to newly
established enterprises or existing
enterprises operating under
changed conditions
Corporate governance of the
promotional bank
Formal basis (law, charter) is
appropriate to the overall political
and economic setting
Formal basis (law, charter) is at




65 lead to the hypothesis that promotional banks will
- have difficulty disbursing their funds, or will be exposed to higher-than-expected
credit risks,
- primarily lend to the large medium-sized firms, and/or
- start lending directly to the target group.
                                                
65  In this context it is remarkable that of the eight qualitative indicators of transition compiled by the
EBRD every year, the financial sector indicators and the indicator “Governance & enterprise
restructuring” are the ones in which the scores are lowest on average for all countries.64
If the last of these three possibilities materialises, there will almost automatically be a
concentration on the upper end of the target group, as promotional banks have no
branches and employ only a small staff, and are thus incapable of deploying the kind of
credit technology that would enable them to lend to the target group on a cost-covering
basis. Moreover, if a promotional bank engages in direct lending, there will be an
increase in the already existing risk that it too be affected by the adverse political and
economic environment. In other words, despite the terms of the law and the charter,
political and personal factors may after all come to determine lending decisions.
As has already been mentioned several times, the transition economies should not be
regarded as a homogenous group. The regional differences that characterise the
transition process as a whole are will presumably be reflected in all three categories
referred to in Overview 4.1. In other words, the deviation of reality from the
assumptions on which the promotional bank approach are based is probably most
pronounced in the NIS and the countries of Southeastern Europe, whereas it is less
severe in the countries where reforms have reached a more advanced stage.
4.6 Promotional Banks in Transition Economies – A Tentative Assessment of
Achievements to Date
As the cautiously worded heading of this section implies, it is hardly possible to subject
the hypothesis formulated above to empirical testing. This is partly because there is not
enough data on those indicators that would permit a quantitative analysis of promotional
banks’ activities, especially on the number, average volume and arrears rate of the loans
funded by the individual promotional banks. Nor is it possible to ascertain the extent to
which loans are being issued directly to the final borrowers by the promotional banks
themselves or – as called for by the classic version of the approach – channelled via
commercial banks. And finally, it is totally impossible to judge the extent to which
political factors influence or have influenced lending practice, whether in connection
with funding for credit proposals submitted by the commercial banks or with direct
lending to the final borrowers. However, since this paper focuses on the suitability of
the approach in terms of its basic design, an examination of the results achieved to date
will serve merely to determine whether they are in line with the hypotheses derived from
the comparison of the two operating environments (post-1945 Germany and post-1989
Central and Eastern Europe) with regard to the key categories for the promotional bank
approach: target group, banking system, and corporate governance.65
It is possible to formulate three statements which describe the results achieved to date
by promotional banks and projects involving advisory assistance to promotional banks:
1. Almost all of the already operating promotional banks that are being advised and/or
funded by KfW are located in the transition economies that have progressed furthest
along the road to reform.
66 They are the Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (HBOR), the Hungarian Investment and Development Bank (MBFB),
the Slovakian Guarantee and Development Bank (SZRB), the Lithuanian
Development Bank (LDB), Optiva Bank in Estonia and UkrEximBank in Ukraine.
67
2. The Croatian promotional bank HBOR, on which detailed information is available,
has become actively involved in all of the operational businesses provided for under
the design on which it was based, i.e. it not only runs SME programmes but also
finances infrastructure and housing projects. KfW alone has provided it with credit
lines totalling DM 110 million, of which DM 50 million was (supposed to be) used
for infrastructure finance. HBOR has also established partnerships with other
international financial institutions and serves as an executing agency for their
programmes. For example, in September 1998 it signed a loan agreement with the
World Bank for a total of DM 65 million, to be spent on financing infrastructure and
environmental measures. It is also co-operating with the EBRD, and more specific
data are available on the DM 50 million EBRD credit line. It was used to finance
loans to “companies operating and owning tourist facilities throughout Croatia, in
amounts ranging from DM 165,000 to DM 5.5 million, on a commercial basis. The
project can be regarded as very successful; only one year after starting to operate,
despite a delayed start caused by problems in obtaining a government guarantee, 93
per cent of the credit line had been disbursed, with 60 sub-projects.” (Pissarides
(1998), p. 13). HBOR was also the first promotional bank which succeeded in
issuing a bond on the Euromarket (KfW (1997), p. 7).
                                                
66 By the end of 1998, KfW had provided credit lines totalling DM 450 million to promotional banks in
Central and Eastern Europe. More than half of this amount, namely DM 280 million, went to the
institutions in Croatia and Hungary.
67 All of these institutions are banks which had already been established as development banks or had
functioned as state foreign-trade banks (so-called forex banks or export-import banks) prior to the
collapse of communism or had evolved from such institutions. As a result, the advisory assistance
provided by KfW was designed to bring about an institutional reorientation and/or a reorientation of
their business policies in line with the promotional-bank approach. The example of Optiva Bank,
which describes itself as a regular commercial bank, shows how difficult it is to effect such a
reorientation.66
3. In transition economies that are lagging behind in the reform process, the
promotional banks receiving advisory assistance from KfW are not yet operational,
or have not even been founded,
68 even though the advisory services date from as
long ago as 1993 (in the case of Bulgaria) (KfW (1997), p. 7).
These observations support the hypotheses advanced in the previous section, or at least
they do not contradict them. The problems which have repeatedly delayed the
establishment of, or the start of operations at, promotional banks in many transition
economies – or indeed have led to some projects of this kind being shelved altogether –
appear to fall into the categories that were identified at a theoretical level as problems
inherent to the approach. In particular, the principle that funds should be channelled to
the target group via commercial banks is frequently violated, with the institutions
choosing instead to issue loans directly to the final borrowers. In Lithuania, for example,
the balance sheet of the Lithuanian Development Bank for 31 December 1998 shows
that only 4.5% of its outstanding lending volume was accounted for by “channelled
loans”, i.e. credits to the target group granted by commercial banks. In other words,
more than 95% of the loans were issued directly to enterprises (Lithuanian Development
Bank (1999)).
And to cite another pertinent example, the “Business Development Bank” in Russia
failed to establish itself in the market as a promotional bank.
69 It appears that the DM 50
million line of credit extended by KfW in 1996 has not yet been utilised by the Russian
promotional institution. One must assume that the prevailing conditions in the financial
sector made it impossible for the Russian institution to initiate lending to small and
medium-sized enterprises from the position of a promotional bank. Consequently, the
available development assistance funds have not reached the target group. Adverse
political and economic circumstances may also have impeded the implementation of the
promotional bank approach in Russia, but without more detailed information it is not
possible to determine the extent to which this has been the case.
                                                
68 In contrast to the activities in the above-mentioned countries, advisory assistance in these countries is
usually geared to creating completely new promotional banks.
69  On the origins of the Business Development Bank, see for example N.N. (1993), in: FAZ 28.4.1993,
p. 17 and N.N. (1994), in: FAZ 14.2.1994, p. 13.67
In Southeastern Europe the difficulty of establishing promotional banks or launching
operations appears to be due to several factors. For one thing, almost all of the countries
in this region are politically unstable. This makes it more difficult to realise a project
which – as has been shown – depends on political leadership both at a formal level (for
the passing of laws) and at an operational level (for the appointment of supervisory
board members and management personnel). However, even in those cases where
promotional banks have been set up, the dominance of the political sphere has had a
negative impact. In Macedonia, for example, the change of government that took place
in October 1998 impeded the establishment and launch of the Macedonian promotional
bank because its General Manager and the members of its Board of Directors – officials
from the ministries represented on the Board – had been appointed by the outgoing
government and were therefore no longer certain of government backing. Situations like
this cause delays, the consequences of which must ultimately be borne by the target
group, who are made to wait that much longer for an appropriate supply of credit
facilities. Thus, in the current political and economic environment, promotional banks
have not always proved to be the “flexible and efficient” instrument at the interface
between the state and the market that the concept in its classic form suggests they should
be.
Yet there is cause to doubt whether political instability alone is responsible for the
difficulties that are hampering attempts to put the promotional bank approach into
practice in these countries. After all, politicians in the countries involved have
themselves called for the promotional banks to be set up (KfW (1997), p. 5).
Furthermore, as already mentioned, KfW generally offers the prospect of a credit line
for a newly founded promotional bank to kick-start its lending activities and avoid a
situation in which “the advisory assistance fails to bear fruit or make a lasting impact
due to a lack of specific opportunities to apply the advice received and to a lack of
lending practice.” (KfW (1997), p. 6). These lines of credit are known as “Ungebundene
Finanzkredite” (UFK) [Non-Specific Financing Credits], and are guaranteed by the
German government. Under these circumstances, every political leadership that takes
over responsibility for running a country could be expected to have an interest in seeing
a promotional bank establish itself and go into operation. Therefore, it seems unlikely
that political instability per se is the sole cause of the problems facing the promotional
bank approach in Southeastern European countries.
Three other possible explanations suggest themselves:68
1. The high cost of establishing a promotional bank, i.e. the provision of equity, which
has to borne by the government budget.
2. Resistance to the promotional bank approach on the part of the local central banks or
the IMF and/or the World Bank based on objections of a macroeconomic,
70 banking
supervisory
71 or political nature.
3. When political leaders in transition economies apply for support in establishing a
public-sector bank, the kind of institution they have in mind is essentially a classic
development bank that practices direct lending to the target group, rather than a
promotional bank of the KfW type. Indeed, the politicians feel that, given the
diagnosed inability and/or unwillingness of the local commercial banks to offer
loans to the target group, there is (also) an objective urgent need for such a bank; in
other words, the call for such an institution need not be (solely) based on political
considerations. However, the interest of the politicians starts to wane when the
implications of the promotional bank approach become clearer to them, i.e. when
they appreciate that the responsibility for lending operations and credit decisions is
supposed to lie with the commercial banks.
The available information on the promotional bank in Croatia also appears to confirm
the hypotheses advanced in the preceding section. On the one hand, Croatia is a country
which, after the war with Serbia and the end of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, has
had a comparatively stable political climate, even though the conditions for sound
corporate governance have not been entirely favourable. After the government had
approved the establishment of a promotional bank based on the KfW model, the project
was successfully implemented – also in terms of its formal components (the passing of
an appropriate law and charter) However, judging by the credit lines which the bank has
received from KfW, lending to SMEs appears not to be such a dominant line of business
as the model would seem to call for. The scale of its housing and infrastructure finance
activities almost certainly outweighs its SME financing by a significant margin.
Moreover, the details of the EBRD credit line mentioned by Pissarides (1998) indicate
that very few businesses at the lower end of the target group are being reached: on this
                                                
70  As a rule, central banks are particularly eager to prevent lending on the basis of subsidised interest
rates, which they see as undermining their stability-oriented interest rate policy. There have even been
episodes in KfW’s history when the Bundesbank expressed concerns about KfW’s activities as a
promotional bank; see Harries (1998).
71  Here the main objection is to the special status enjoyed by a promotional bank which exempts it from
compliance with banking supervisory regulations.69
basis, the average loan size works out to DM 775,000.
72 In the tourist industry, in
particular, Croatian firms have substantial experience, given that this business was
flourishing long before 1989. Therefore, based on the theoretical considerations
presented earlier in this paper regarding the importance of experience in the enterprise
sector, it is hardly surprising that the credit line was disbursed relatively quickly.
Viewed overall, the results of KfW’s advisory services to promotional banks and the
activities of the banks themselves demonstrate the importance of bearing in mind that,
especially with regard to efforts to create appropriate financing facilities for SMEs in
transition economies, “the specific current scenario and setting cannot be compared with
the situation in Western Europe at the end of the Second World War.” (Harries (1998),
p. 45) The institutional, political and economic parameters are quite different today, and
point to the conclusion that the promotional bank approach, as it has been practised on a
large scale in Germany by KfW since 1971, is either not at all suited to the transition
economies, or can only applied with a different objective and/or focus. Even in those
transition economies where they are already operating, the impression created by the
promotional banks is that they are in essence classic development banks with an SME
department whose main focus is on medium-sized enterprises, rather than SME
promotional banks which concentrate primarily on medium and small enterprises, while
the other tasks of development banks, e.g. infrastructure and housing finance, are mere
sidelines.
73 In principle, there would be no reason to object to such a shift of priorities,
or business policy, as long as sound banking criteria were being applied, i.e. provided
that the known weaknesses of development banks did not manifest themselves. After
all, it is an undeniable fact that in the countries concerned the modernisation of
infrastructure and housing and the promotion of medium-sized firms are important tasks
                                                
72 In its annual report for 1998, the Lithuanian Development Bank states that the average size of the
loans in its portfolio is EUR 640,000, which is equivalent to around DM 1.2 million; see Lithuanian
Development Bank (1999).
73  On its web site (http://www.mfb.hu/english/index.htm) the Hungarian development bank MFB
describes its lending activities as follows: “MFB plays a key role in facilitating the transformation of
the Hungarian economy by providing loans to industrial companies, particularly operating in the
fields of infrastructure, telecommunications, food and food processing, and pharmaceuticals. In
addition, the Bank is also active in the energy, chemical and environmental sectors. Its clientele
includes concession companies (i.e. companies given concessions to operate state assets, e.g. roads,
telecommunications, etc.), enterprises carrying out large-scale capital expenditure projects and foreign
owned multinational companies. Furthermore, MFB pays special attention to supporting small and
medium-sized enterprises, a sector that plays an important role in the development of the Hungarian
economy.” As of end-1997, MFB’s total outstanding loan portfolio accounted for roughly 26% of its
total assets.70
from the point of view of development policy. However, it should be noted that under
the present policies, the activities of the promotional banks are not contributing to an
improvement in the situation of the great mass of small businesses, which account for
more than 90% of the target group, and they are also not promoting financial sector
development. Yet precisely these tasks have been defined as the key objectives of the
promotional bank approach.
This raises the question of whether other historical precedents exist which might more
appropriately serve as models for projects designed to achieve these objectives –
promotion of small businesses and the financial sector – in the institutional and
(political–)economic environment of the transition economies. The following chapter
argues that there are valuable lessons to be learned from the development of the German
financial system in the 19
th century.71
5. Banks and Enterprise Financing in 19
th Century Germany
5.1 Introductory Remarks on the Relevance of Historical–Economic Analysis as
a Basis for Recommendations Regarding the Transition Process in Central
and Eastern Europe
“It is an economy with simple production techniques in small operating facilities; petty
merchants and usurers are as despised as they are necessary. Progress in agriculture is
seriously impeded by an outdated agrarian order. Chronic underemployment of the
workforce is one of the main problems, and despite moral appeals, the masses are hardly
willing to save at all... The economy relies to a considerable extent on other countries,...
Monetary stability is periodically under threat and sometimes the currency has been
utterly ruined by ill-conceived government measures.”
74
This is not a description of a backward Eastern European transition economy, but a
characterisation of the English economy in the 17
th century. Borchardt (1984, p. 86) uses
it to illustrate the suitability of historical–economic analysis for providing development
policymakers with a referential framework which enables them “to identify problems
more clearly, to ask the right questions and point to answers that might be of interest”,
though he does not claim that economic history can offer quick and easy solutions to the
problems of today.
Borchardt demonstrates that not only English but also and in particular German
economic history may serve as a point of reference for present-day development policy
issues by imagining what would happen if a team of consultants were commissioned –
say, by the World Bank or KfW – to visit 18
th century Germany and prepare a study on
the country’s economic situation. Some of the results of the fictitious “fact finding
mission” presented by Borchardt can readily be applied to the question of which are the
most suitable instruments to promote SME financing in transition economies. For
example, the hypothetical mission to 18
th century Germany would have reported that it
was difficult to “impose state authority over the particular interests of traditional forces,
and (the mission) would have reported incredible instances of corruption. Yet what they
may have found most horrifying of all was the blatantly unjust distribution of incomes,
with a very narrow, very high peak at the top of the social pyramid, and below it a broad
                                                
74  Borchardt (1984), pp. 75f., quoting Fisher (1957); re-translated by the author.72
base of mass poverty.” (Borchardt (1984), p. 77). There are obvious similarities between
this account and the description of present conditions in a number of transition
economies contained in section 4.4 of this paper, based on the EBRD’s Transition
Report.
Since the theory behind this historical approach appears plausible, and since parallels
clearly exist between past societies and present-day transition economies, as the above
example shows, the author feels encouraged to present a brief financial sector study of
19th century Germany, applying the same approach as he has used on numerous
occasions in the past to prepare (or co-author) studies for bilateral and multilateral
development organisations.
75 Specifically, the study addresses four issues:
a) How far has the private small and medium-sized enterprise sector developed? What
are the essential characteristics of this sector?
b) Which institutions comprise the financial sector? How do the commercial banks
operate on the assets side of their balance sheets, and how do they finance this asset-
side business?
c) How can the financing situation of the target group be described?
d) Which measures is the government taking to improve the target group’s financing
situation?
The aim is to discover whether and to what extent further parallels can be drawn
between the current situation in Central and Eastern Europe (a–c) and which
conclusions can be drawn with regard to the design of efficient interventions by
governments and/or bilateral and multilateral donors (d) to improve the financing
situation of small and medium-sized enterprises in the private sector.
                                                
75  In this respect, the present section follows up an intuition expressed by Caprio (1995), p. 259, that “a
model of ‘back to the future’ might be appropriate in the financial sector, looking more to how
industrial countries’ financial systems functioned in the 18
th and 19
th centuries, when less reliance was
placed on the government as a guarantor and supervisor, than on its late 20
th-century manifestation.”73
5.2 The Development of the Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Sector in
19
th Century Germany
The development of a sector of private small and medium-sized enterprises in Germany
began with the introduction of Gewerbefreiheit (freedom of trade; free access to trade),
which took practical effect in Prussia, the largest German state, when the Hardenberg
Tax Edict of 1810 was issued. This edict stated that persons wishing to open a business
establishment had to meet only a single requirement, i.e. that they merely had to obtain a
tax certificate, and this meant that the guilds could no longer set rules for market entry
(Henning (1973), pp. 62f). It is very difficult to assess the (quantitative) impacts of this
new legal situation during the first half of the 19
th century with any precision because
there is insufficient statistical data available on this period (Henning (1973), p. 66). It is
fair to say, though, that as a result of the introduction of freedom of trade, the number of
master craftsmen, and the number of business establishments, rose over the short term,
particularly in rural areas. By the same token, it seems clear that, over the medium term,
the increasing competition also led to the closure of establishments.










1780 65 19 16 10.0
1800 62 21 17 10.5
1825 59 22 19 12.6
1850 55 24 21 15.8
1875 49 30 21 18.6
1900 38 37 25 25.5
1914 34 38 28 31.3
1935 30 38 32 29.9
1970* 5 48 47 30.1
* West Germany
Source: Henning (1973), p. 20
Given the sectoral breakdown of employment (see Table 5.1), it would appear that,
overall, the first half of the 19
th century was still characterised by a relatively large
degree of stability as regards the basic structure of the economy. Indeed, between 1780
and 1850, employment in agriculture declined by a total of only 10 percentage points,74
while the figures for the secondary and tertiary sectors each increased by only 5
percentage points. But overall employment rose considerably during this period,
increasing from 10 million to just under 16 million. However, the increment was rather
small compared with the one recorded for the subsequent 70-year period.
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11.  Wood turners
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       Grand totals 660 009 363 601 296 408 1 515 065 532 066 982 999
Source: Kocka/Mütter (1984), pp. 166f75
Table 5.2 shows the earliest comprehensive statistics that could be obtained by the
author on what would today be called the small and medium-sized enterprise sector.
Thus, 1849 marks the beginning of the period for which one can make well-founded
statements on the composition of the SME sector. The above data on employment in
crafts and skilled trades in Prussia in 1849 and 1895 show that in the mid-19
th century
more than half of the total number of persons employed in the occupations covered by
the data were self-employed. In other words, the average number of persons employed
as wage earners by enterprises in crafts/skilled trades was less than one. And 50 years
later, the situation had not changed all that much: on average, there were still fewer than
two persons in dependent employment in crafts/skilled trades for every self-employed
person working in this part of the economy.
This initial evidence that micro and small enterprises accounted for the bulk of all
private economic activity in 19
th century Germany is confirmed by the data for the
second half of the century. Although industrialisation was already in full swing during
this period, and medium-sized and large enterprises were rapidly gaining in importance,
micro and small enterprises with 50 or fewer employees continued to account for both
the majority of enterprises and the bulk of employment in industry and crafts/artisanal
production (mining was an exception here); and the dominance of small and very small
establishments was even more pronounced in the service sector (see Table 5.3). Even as
late as 1907, just under one-third of all persons employed in industry and crafts/artisanal
production worked in micro enterprises with between 1 and 5 employees, and such
businesses still accounted for almost 90% of the total number of enterprises operating in
these areas.
Table 5.3: Share of the Total Number of Establishments and of Total
Employment Accounted for by Enterprises of Various Sizes (%)
a) Industry and crafts/artisanal production



















1875 n.a. 63.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1882 95.9 59.8 3.7 17.4 0.4 22.8
1895 92.8 41.8 6.5 24.7 0.8 33.5
1907 89.8 31.2 8.9 26.4 1.3 42.4
Source: Fischer (1985), p. 40776
b) Services (includes some skilled trades)



















1882 96.1 75.6 3.8 20.2 0.1 4.2
1895 94.6 69.7 5.2 24.2 0.2 6.1
1907 93.8 61.6 5.9 26.6 0.3 11.8
Source of underlying data: Henning (1996), p. 881
Micro and small enterprises also accounted for the bulk of the establishments in the
trade sector (according to the available figures, there were 617,000 trade enterprises in
1882 and 1,088,000 in 1907); indeed, at the beginning of the 20
th century only 6.6% of
all trade enterprises had more than 50 employees (Fischer (1985), p. 409).
Thus, overall it is clear that even during the part of the 19
th century when Germany was
rapidly industrialising, “one cannot speak of ...an imperative in all sectors to form large-
scale enterprises (concentration and centralisation of capital).” (Plumpe (1996), p. 51).
The economic reasons for the lack of such an imperative are well-known. They are the
same reasons as those that are advanced today to make the case for promoting the
private micro and small enterprise sector in many countries, and especially in the
transition economies: the fact that these enterprises, which are particularly flexible and
efficient, are in a better position than large enterprises to satisfy the demand for custom-
made goods, the demand for goods produced in small production runs, and generally,
the demand for high-quality, well-made products (particularly handmade goods)
(Henning (1996), p. 878).
In terms of a qualitative assessment of the evolution of the German economy and of
enterprise financing in the 19
th century, the development of this sector is of particular
interest. Indeed, in the final analysis the profits earned in the trade and craft enterprises
that existed in the first half of the 19
th century were the source of the capital that was
needed in the second half of the 19
th century to build larger enterprises and introduce
capital-intensive production methods (Klein (1971), pp. 124f). Thus, micro and small
enterprises operating in precisely these two sectors laid the foundation for the creation
of industrial firms in the second half of the 19
th century – whether such firms were
created directly through the transformation of these small businesses into industrial
enterprises, or indirectly through the use by their proprietors of capital derived from77
retained profits to join forces with other investors and found new industrial enterprises
(once the necessary legal framework had been put in place, such equity participations
could also be effected through the purchase of shares) (Pierenkemper (1990), pp. 88ff.).
And the banking system played an important role in this process of capital mobilisation
and allocation.
5.3 The Development of the Banking System in 19
th Century Germany
76
a) The origins of banks in Germany and the nature of their asset-side business in the
early years
The first modern banking firms were created in Germany at the beginning of the 19
th
century (Kindleberger (1993), p. 118). As a rule, they had their origins in (trade)
enterprises, i.e. their capital base consisted of holdings of financial assets which had
been accumulated internally through the retention of profits (Tilly (1967), p. 159, Pohl,
H. (1982), p. 75, Feldenkirchen (1982), p. 83). Formally speaking, these institutions
were private banking houses (Privatbankiers), i.e. banking establishments operated by
“sole proprietors and managing partners who engaged in banking business by using their
own capital and assuming unlimited liability up to the value of all of their assets ... and
with sole authority to make decisions.” (Pohl, M. (1991), p. 38). They decided to
establish banking firms because, as merchants, they knew from their own experience
that there was an effective demand for finance from external sources, and specifically,
they knew this because “in addition to, and in conjunction with, their business of
supplying goods, they had also engaged in the business of supplying money” (Klein
(1982), p. 245) Thus, in many cases they carried on serving borrowers to whom they had
already lent repeatedly in the past, and thus continued long-standing financing
relationships, the only difference being that they now assumed a different role – that of a
formal financial institution rather than that of a merchant – when providing funds to
these customers (Hauswald (1995), p. 30).
In view of their origins, the banks still operated either largely or exclusively as “closed
shops” during the first half of the 19
th century. Their clientele consisted almost
                                                
76  The discussion presented in this section and in Section 5.4 is based largely on material contained in
Winkler (forthcoming)78
exclusively of enterprises and individuals who were well-known to the bankers as a
result of many years of personal experience in dealing with them in trade and financing
transactions, and who thus had established their creditworthiness beyond a doubt
(Feldenkirchen (1982), p. 86, fn. 31). For this reason, a bank had only very limited
scope to branch out and expand the size of the area or region it served. It was generally
recognised that only “a banker who lives in the district, who has always lived there,
whose whole mind is a history of the district and its changes, is easily able to lend
money safely there. But a manager deputed by a single central establishment does so
with difficulty. The worst people will come to him and ask for loans. His ignorance is a
mark for all the shrewd and crafty people thereabouts. He will have endless difficulties
in establishing the circulation of the distant bank, because he has not the local
knowledge which alone can teach him how to issue that circulation with safety.“
(Bagehot (1873), pp. 43f.).
In the mid-19
th century this close link between lenders and borrowers assumed a new
form in Germany as the recently founded joint stock banks began to participate directly
in the establishment of firms and initiate the foundation of enterprises, either alone or in
concert with others: “Particularly during the first twenty years of their existence, the
four banks that were established during the period 1848 - 1856 (A. Schaaffhausen’scher
Bankverein, Bank für Handel und Industrie, Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft, Disconto-
Gesellschaft) served primarily as investment banks. They focused on the acquisition and
placement of shares in industrial enterprises, and not only assisted in founding firms but
in some cases also took the lead in establishing new companies.” (Pohl, M. (1982a), pp.
277f)
It should be noted, though, that such involvements in the foundation of industrial
enterprises were more the exception than the rule.
77 Indeed, the granting of short-term
credits to meet working capital needs accounted for most of the lending business of the
private bankers and the first joint stock banks: “Most credits extended by private
bankers (and by the Kreditbanken that followed them) were ostensibly short term in
nature, because that form of credit was in the banking tradition [author’s emphasis],
and because working capital – relative to fixed capital – was of great importance in the
German economy before 1870.” (Tilly (1967), p. 177) That this was indeed an important
                                                
77  Pohl, H. (1985), p. 75; Tilly (1967, p. 160) characterises such activities as a “relatively local
phenomenon.”79
tradition in banking is shown by the fact that the following principle is set forth in the
charters of both the Schaaffhausen’sche Bankverein and the Darmstädter Bank für
Handel und Industrie: “The bank is authorised to engage in all forms of banking
business, i.e. those types of business in which it can withdraw the funds it has
committed easily and at any time [author’s emphasis], should it have a need for these
funds.”
78
Overall, by adopting this policy of focusing on short-term lending and dealing almost
exclusively with borrowers who were well-known to them, the banks were able to avoid
many information- and incentive-related problems that are usually associated with the
provision of external finance. Accordingly, by around 1870, when the pace of
industrialisation increased markedly, most of the banks were already experienced in
dealing with credit risks. But while the quality of lending operations was thus sufficient
to enable the banks to support the further development of the real economy, in
quantitative terms their lending activities were not yet able to make a significant
contribution to this process. Hence, it is now time to look at the banks’ liability-side
business, i.e. the ways in which they funded their lending and other asset-side
operations.
b) How banks funded their operations
Up until the mid-19
th century, the banks funded their operations largely by increasing
their equity capital or by retaining profits, i.e. via internal financing (Tilly (1967), p.
161). To the extent that they incurred liabilities by issuing debt instruments, these were
used by the banks’ customers primarily as a means of payment; both bank notes and
other instruments that could be utilised in the payment of debts were issued. Legal
tender in the form of coins was either in short supply, or, if there was an adequate
supply, the great variety of coins in circulation often made it difficult to assess the
quality of currency. This made it easier for the banks to fund their operations by issuing
bank notes and other debt instruments that could be employed as means of payment.
Indeed, there was strong demand for liabilities offered by “respected issuing houses”
(Borchardt (1976, p. 10)) which could be used as a means of payment even if these did
not bear interest. As a result, the liability side of German banks’ balance sheets in the
mid-19
th century was dominated by instruments issued in conjunction with lending
                                                
78  Borchardt (1961), p. 415, quoting Riesser (1905).80
activities which were intended to serve as means of payment and were largely non-
interest-bearing, and by equity capital. By contrast, other funding options – i.e. demand
deposits, time deposits and savings deposits, which are of principal importance today –
played only a secondary role in terms of their contribution to total liabilities and
equity.
79 As late as 1872, equity capital still accounted for 45% of the consolidated
balance sheet total of the German banking system of the German banking system still
came to 45% (Stützel (1964), p. 46).
Obviously, though, just because a bank is very well capitalised, i.e. just because its
equity accounts for a large proportion of total liabilities and equity capital, it will not
necessarily have, in absolute terms, a large volume of funds available for lending. And
in fact, from 1850 on, the private banking houses, which operated independently of one
another, increasingly found that, as individual institutions, they were no longer in a
position to satisfy the demand for funds exhibited by Germany’s emerging (large-scale)
industrial enterprises. Thus, as soon as the requisite legal foundations had been created,
a number of private bankers founded joint stock banks, which, in the years after 1870,
rapidly supplanted the private banking houses as the country’s leading financial
institutions (Edwards/Ogilvie (1995), p. 9). Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and
Commerzbank, which are still operating today, were the three most important banks of
this new type.
Although the joint stock banks dominated the German banking system after 1870,
initially there was little change in the structure of the liability side of the banks’ balance
sheets, i.e. in the role of equity capital as a funding source. Table 5.4 provides data on
equity and short-term liabilities as percentages of total liabilities and equity capital for
five commercial banks. The figures underscore that, even at the larger institutions, the
ratio of equity to total liabilities and equity capital remained at around 30% up until the
end of the 19
th century (Deutsche Bank was an exception here). Thus, in terms of its
quantitative significance as a funding source, equity capital was still almost as important
at the end of the century as demand deposits (i.e. very short-term liabilities). Following
the establishment of a national payments system, which was initiated by the Reichsbank
in 1870 (Goodhart (1988), Pohl, M. (1982a), p. 282), the banks began offering demand
                                                
79  The same can be said for banks in the U.S. during this period: “In contrast to modern practice,
however, capital stock – not deposits – was the principal means to this end [i.e. the foundation and
expansion of banks – author’s note].“ Lamoreaux (1986), S. 653f.81
deposit facilities. Deutsche Bank was the first institution to enter this market, serving
both firms and private households, and as there proved to be a sizeable demand for these
new liability-side products, the other joint stock banks soon followed suit.
Table 5.4: Equity Capital (EC) and Short-Term Liabilities (Deposits and Accounts
Payable = D/AP) as Percentage of Total Liabilities and Equity Capital
for Selected German Commercial Banks, 1882 – 1913








EC D/AP EC D/AP EC D/AP EC D/AP EC D/AP
1882 40.95 32.80 59.69 29.45 35.02 42.10 35.48 45.20 40.43 29.84
1890 44.17 25.46 37.30 32.53 17.72 48.01 28.18 47.48 36.92 32.85
1894 39.73 24.95 37.87 32.46 16.33 54.57 23.46 50.92 30.00 39.74
1899 44.61 24.93 34.35 31.16 17.26 55.24 29.94 39.67 35.03 33.35
1903 35.60 39.25 32.19 34.98 13.13 64.77 25.20 41.71 29.33 40.43
1907 25.14 55.09 23.19 49.37 10.69 67.55 19.98 47.11 24.41 40.67
1913 16.36 62.09 19.97 53.87 8.91 70.28 16.15 54.43 22.44 53.27
Source: Feldenkirchen (1982), pp. 103f
It was not until after the turn of the century that equity began to be eclipsed on a
significant scale by demand deposits. After 1900 the proportion of equity capital
declined considerably, while the share of total liabilities and equity capital accounted for
by demand deposits increased, rising to a level of over 50% at all of the banks covered
by Table 5.4. Nonetheless, German banks continued to have very sizeable capital
resources. In fact, as measured by capitalisation levels, the three largest firms in
Germany in 1913 were banks, and of the top 25 no fewer than 17 were banks (Tilly
(1992), p. 94).82
5.4 Enterprise Financing in the 19
th Century
From the above characterisation of the asset-side business of the private banking houses
and the first joint stock banks it can be surmised that the quantitative significance of
financial intermediaries for the financing of entrepreneurial activities at the start of the
19
th century was small. Among the many enterprises that existed, only those few which
had been well known to the private bankers for a long time, i.e. those entrepreneurs who
had built a reputation as shrewd businessmen and thus as creditworthy borrowers, could
rely on finance provided by banks. As already indicated, entrepreneurial activities were
to a large extent financed with internal funds, drawn either from current operating
profits or from the accumulated profits of previous periods. Accumulated profits were
particularly important as a source of finance for the building of the industrial
enterprises, whose capital often came originally from profits earned during a previous
phase in the firm’s history, when it was still a trade business (see Tilly (1967), p. 156,
Pohl, H. (1985), p. 77, Klein (1971)). Other sources of capital included family, friends
and relations (see Pierenkemper (1990), Klein (1971)), so that it was often difficult to
draw a clear dividing line between the entrepreneur’s business and his private household
(Kocka (1979), pp. 103ff).
80
However, it should also be noted that these “entrepreneur families” were interested in
external finance only to a limited extent. For one thing, it was “long considered very
unusual, almost immoral, to run up debts.” (Borchardt (1961), p. 411) For another, the
entrepreneurs feared that by borrowing capital they would be exposing their businesses
to external scrutiny and possibly even attempts to influence business policy, a situation
which they were anxious to avoid. “Independence was a family tradition.” (Pohl, H.
(1985), p. 76) This striving for independence expressed itself not only in the
entrepreneurs’ desire to limit their borrowing to a minimum, but also in an “aversion
and opposition” to the very real opportunities that existed for raising external equity:
“The desire for self-sufficiency and independence caused many founding entrepreneurs
to reject the idea of converting their firm into a joint stock company, even though their
refusal meant that they largely denied their business access to the capital market.” (Pohl,
M. (1991), p. 44)
                                                
80  For example, it took 24 years before the firm Krupp received its first bank loan; up until then, almost
all of the enterprise’s external financing had come from members of the family; see Pierenkemper
(1990).83
This tendency to be negatively disposed towards borrowing external funds was
reinforced by the fact that, up to the middle of the 19
th century, investment volumes,
even among industrial enterprises, were still relatively small (Klein (1971), p. 120). In
this respect it was perfectly rational for enterprises to finance fixed asset investments
largely with their own funds. However, the existing banks played an important role in
making this possible, precisely because they were willing to provide short-term loans to
finance working capital, thus leaving internal resources free to be invested in long-term
real capital (Tilly (1967), p. 174).
As already mentioned, the operating environment changed in the second half of the 19th
century. Many firms were no longer able to raise the required amounts of capital
internally or from the informal financial sector. This need for external finance led on the
one hand to the establishment of joint stock companies by non-financial enterprises, i.e.
to external equity financing, the hitherto scarcely used method of raising funds which
was broadly disliked by entrepreneurs. On the other hand, the demand for credit also
increased, prompting the banks to set up joint stock banks, as also described above.
Both developments made it impossible to continue providing capital almost exclusively
on the basis of personal acquaintance. A typical principal-agent problem had now
evolved between, on the one side, the now more numerous bank owners, some of whom
invested considerable sums of money in order to supply their bank with the equity it
needed, and on the other side, the bank’s management. Behind this principal-agent
problem lies the same information problem as the one that characterises any external
financing relationship: How could the bank’s owners check whether, and to what extent,
the task of monitoring the borrowers, a task which the bank’s owners had delegated to
the bank’s management, was actually being carried out, if the management based its
credit decisions solely or primarily on personal relationships with and/or personal
knowledge of the borrowers?
81,82
                                                
81  “Joint stock banks being of course obliged to act through agents and by a principal, and therefore
under the restraint of general rules, cannot be guided by so nice a reference to degrees of difference in
the character of responsibility of parties; nor can they undertake to regulate the assistance to be
granted to concerns under temporary embarrassment by so accurate a reference to the circumstances,
favourable or unfavourable, of each case.” Bagehot (1873), p. 122. The theoretical basis of this
principal-agent problem was first explained by Jensen/Meckling (1976).84
The truth of the statement that “there is no more unsafe government for a bank than that
of an eager and active manager, ... for the manager may easily glide into dangerous and
insecure transactions, nor can the board effectually check him” (Bagehot (1873), p.
127), became clear in Germany after the law governing joint stock companies was
liberalised and the wave of new company starts came to an end in the mid-1870s. Many
of the newly founded joint stock banks had to go into liquidation, and the recession in
the real economy was followed by financial crisis (Edwards/Ogilvie (1995), p. 7, Pohl,
M. (1982a), p. 226).
Two conclusions were drawn from these experiences: On the one hand, the state
introduced tougher requirements for the founding of a bank as a joint stock company.
83
On the other, the banks’ business policies changed. In order to contain the risks arising
from the control problem which the owners had with their managers, the asset-side
business became largely formalised (Pohl, H. (1982), p. 121). This meant that the banks
largely abandoned the kind of lending practices that were tantamount to equity
investments and/or were based solely on personal relationships, and increasingly went
over to financing firms with short-term loans backed by collateral. Accordingly, short-
term loans on current account as a share of total lending in Germany rose “from 50.8%
in 1883 to 70.7% in 1909, while the share of long-term credit (securities) dropped from
12% in 1883 to 0.3% in 1913.”
84
In the literature there is disagreement over the correct way to evaluate this predominance
of formal, short-term advances on current account, given that as a rule these loans were
repeatedly rolled over so that they were, de facto, long-term loans (Wellhöner/Wixforth
(1990), pp. 15ff). A major reason for the increase in current account lending was that it
became a precondition for the issuing and start-up business. Now, in contrast to the
practice in the 1850s and 60s, the banks initially prefinanced a company’s shares with a
                                                                                                                                              
82  This control problem is even more acute in the relationship between depositors, i.e. providers of
external capital, and bank managers. It is one of the central arguments advanced to justify state
regulation of the banking sector; see Dewatripont/Tirole (1996).
83  This was a regulatory instrument that had already been introduced in England under Peel’s Act of
1845 (Bagehot (1873), p. 123) which imposed relatively high entry barriers to the banking market. On
the one hand, it afforded the existing banks protection against competitors and thus ensured that, even
if their investment decisions were relatively risk-averse they would still earn a sufficiently large
return. On the other hand, the high entry barriers kept the banking market free from banks which were
exposed to a greater risk of moral hazard.
84  Pohl, H. (1985), p. 80; similar findings are reported by Pohl, M. (1991), p. 41.85
loan. The shares were issued later, after the investment had already been made. “The
issue enabled the advanced funds to be repaid and the new firm could continue to
conduct its normal business.” (Pohl, M. (1982a), p. 282). As the timing of the issue
depended on the state of the stock market, this prefinancing arrangement could
sometimes run for a term of several years. Wellhöner/Wixforth ((1990), p. 23) even
regard the banks’ role as mediators between industrial enterprises and the capital market
as their single main contribution to industrial accumulation. This puts a slightly different
slant on the hypothesis expressed in the introduction that the particular contribution of
Germany’s (large) banks to the industrialisation process was the provision of long-term
finance.
However, the question of whether the increasingly important practice of lending on
current account should properly be regarded as short- or long-term lending is less
relevant than it might first appear to be. For, even if all overdraft loans were regarded as
long-term loans, empirical research has shown that “even in the phase of uninterrupted,
continuous expansion of the accumulation process, firms ... did not rely on long-term
credit on current account as the primary factor in financing the growth of their business.
... Instead, self-financing through reinvestment of a portion of the profits and provisions
for capital consumption, and funds raised in domestic and foreign capital markets, from
the entrepreneur’s family and from institutional alternatives to the private banking
sector, were much more important means of corporate finance.” (Wellhöner/Wixforth
(1990), p. 17).
Based on the empirical evidence, the overall picture of corporate finance in Germany in
the second half of the 19th century shows that the volumes of funds being supplied by
the banking system had undergone almost a quantum leap since the first half of the
century. The manner in which the funds were provided, i.e. the credit technology, also
changed to the extent that the personal element increasingly gave way to credit decision-
making based on formal, interpersonally verifiable criteria. Both developments add
weight to the theory that the emergence of the large banks and their (credit) investments
accelerated the rapid industrialisation of Germany in the post-1870 era. However,
internal financing and other, informal, sources of finance continued to play a significant
role in the financing of entrepreneurial activity.
For the financing of small and medium-sized enterprises, however, the question of
whether the loans on current account provided by the large banks should properly be
regarded as short- or long-term finance is largely irrelevant, as the vast majority of these86
firms were in any case excluded from the development of enterprise financing in post-
1870 Germany (Pohl, M. (1991), p. 44). The target group continued to face credit
rationing by the formal financial system. Thus they were forced to satisfy their financing
needs mainly by drawing on internal sources and/or tapping informal sources of external
funds (family, friends and moneylenders).
5.5 Interventions in the Banking System by the State and by Not Exclusively
Commercially Oriented Institutions to Improve the Financing Situation of
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: The Emergence of Target Group-
Oriented Institutions
In the economic history literature, the consensus view is that direct state interventions in
the financial market for the specific purpose of promoting enterprise in general, i.e. not
(only) small and medium-sized enterprises, took place only to a limited extent in the
19th century (Henning (1996), p. 160). Although under the mercantile system of the
17th and 18th centuries, when the state was heavily involved in directing the economy,
state banks were set up whose purpose was to promote trade and industry, “in the 19th
century they were above all institutions whose function was to conduct the state’s
money transactions and above all to procure credit for the state. The state banks were
hardly involved at all in the financing of industry.” (Pohl, H. (1982), pp. 125f) Even
these limited interventions are open to the question raised in Chapter 2 as to whether
they truly overcame a market failure or whether in fact it would be more appropriate to
say that they caused a failure of the state. For, even with regard to this early period,
criticisms could be raised “which in particular emphasise the difference between the
declared aims of the actions and their actual economic effects. Frequently, measures that
were subjectively intended to promote development turned out to be objective
impediments to development.” (Borchardt (1976a), p. 244)
In general, therefore, it can be said that there were no significant state interventions in
the financial system with the aim of promoting small and medium-sized enterprises.
Nonetheless, there was an awareness of the problem of the target group’s lack of access
to financial services and the adverse economic and social effects of this rationing. And
the response to it came in the shape of savings banks and credit co-operatives, the first
of which were set up as the result of private initiatives, often motivated by charitable87
intentions.
85 It was not until a later stage in the development of these institutions that the
state became involved as a founder and regulator (in the case of the municipal savings
banks (Pohl, M. (1982), p. 203)) or simply a regulator (in the case of the credit co-
operatives (Pohl, M. (1982a), p. 338)).
The savings banks emerged in the late 18
th and early 19
th century as the result of an
analysis which concluded that the existing financial institutions were systematically
denying members of the poorer social strata – day labourers, domestic servants and
journeymen – access to financial services, and in particular the opportunity to put aside
small amounts of savings in interest-earning deposits (Pohl, M. (1982), p. 195). As a
logical consequence, up until the First World War the savings banks concentrated
almost exclusively on doing liability-side business with this target group. Their main
clientele consisted not of people who lived below the poverty line, “but rather the target
group was recruited from among those who, although above the poverty line, found
themselves in unstable circumstances and were under constant threat of descending into
poverty.” (Pohl, M. (1982), p. 196).
86 Initially, the mobilisation of savings proved a
laborious business for the savings banks. “Quantitatively, .... the savings banks seem to
have been of minor importance” prior to 1870. “They were dependent upon voluntary
savings to a much larger extent than banks and bankers were, and their development
was thus a growth-induced rather than a growth-inducing phenomenon.” (Tilly (1967),
p. 165)
87 It was not until after 1870, when industrialisation began to pick up speed and
economic growth was stronger, leading to a continual increase in mass incomes, that the
                                                
85  See Geiger (1994), p. 12; Pohl, M. (1982), pp. 202ff.
86  In other words, neither the savings banks nor the credit unions/co-operative banks catered to the
“poorest of the poor”. This insight is relevant to financial sector projects targeted at micro and small
enterprises because sustainable, i.e. cost-covering micro credit programmes are often criticised for not
serving the poorest of the poor. Evidently the founders of the savings banks and credit co-operatives
were already aware that the two aims – cost coverage and sustainability on the one hand, provision of
financial services for the poorest of the poor on the other – could not be achieved simultaneously. Yet
surely no-one would deny that, from the point of view of social policy, both the savings banks and the
co-operative movement were institutions worthy of support, which indeed they received when
appropriate laws were passed.
87  It very quickly became clear that the mobilisation of small savings entailed high transaction costs. “In
order to keep administrative costs down, the savings banks were staffed almost exclusively by part-
timers with regular jobs elsewhere. This shortage of staff meant that the counters were usually open
on only one or two days a week, making it impossible for many wage-labourers and domestic staff to
take their money to the bank.” Pohl, M. (1982), p. 196. The high transaction costs of a deposit
business involving very small amounts are an important reason for recommending that target group-
oriented financial institutions should not yet offer this service when they have only just gone into
operation. See Schmidt/Zeitinger (1994), pp. 86ff.88
success story of the German savings banks movement also took on a quantitative
dimension.
88 The decisive breakthrough came in 1908 when the savings banks became a
modern banking enterprise by introducing the giro system. This gave them the
opportunity –based on Germany’s new Cheque Act – to participate in the national
cashless payments system: “it was here that, boosted by the economic and political
developments of the following years ... , the savings banks seriously entered the
business of ‘banking’, ... .” (Geiger (1994), p. 15).
The savings banks’ asset-side business in the 19
th century was dominated by mortgage
loans, government securities and municipal loans (Pohl (1982a), p. 327, Tilly (1967), p.
165). Effectively, lending to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises did not take
place, indeed it could not take place because neither farmers nor craftsmen and other
small business could provide the high levels of collateral that the savings banks required
from their borrowers (Pohl, M. (1982), p. 203).
89
It was the credit co-operatives in particular that moved in to fill this gap. In urban areas
they were known as “Volksbanken” [People’s Banks], and specialised in catering to the
credit needs of craftsmen and small manufacturers (Pohl, H. (1982), p. 123). Their goal
was to enhance the ability of small and medium-sized businesses to compete with large
enterprises: “To be able to compete with the large firms, the craftsmen needed capital to
purchase machinery and modern tools, and to build up larger stocks of raw materials.
However, small businesses had not been able to accumulate much equity, and banking
institutions which, in their lending policies, were willing to make allowances for the
shortage of collateral among small and medium-sized enterprises, did not exist.” (Pohl,
M. (1982a), p. 202.)
                                                
88  For details, see Pohl, M. (1982a), p. 325.
89  Some members of the savings bank movement did, however, realise that by setting these collateral
requirements, the savings banks were in effect excluding themselves from another major potential
source of business, as well as the payment transaction business from which they were excluded by
law. “In the period 1890–1908 the journal “Sparkasse” ran numerous articles advocating the
introduction of chequeing and current account services. Johann Christian Eberle, a mayor in the state
of Saxony, made a particularly forceful case for the introduction of a progressive, socially-oriented
and reformed savings bank system. Above all, he demanded improvements to the asset-side business,
and particularly the savings banks’ lending business, so that they would be able to provide short-,
medium- and long-term business loans to Mittelstand firms.” (Pohl, M. (1982a), p. 323).89
Initially the co-operative societies did not confine their activities to banking and credit,
but also pursued other social and political ideals and goals, such as caring for neglected
children, providing work for the unemployed and ex-convicts, or setting up popular
libraries. However, it soon became clear “that the different activities could not be
directly reconciled within one and the same co-operative, or under one and the same set
of by-laws. One by one, co-operative societies ceased to pursue their other activities
directly until eventually only the lending business remained.” (Pohl, M. (1982), p.
209).
90
The “professionalisation” of the banking business
91 and the establishment of an
administration that operated strictly according to sound banking principles (Pohl, M.
(1982a), p. 337) was also inevitable for another reason: The members of the co-
operatives not only acquired shares in the business and thus supplied the co-operative
banks with their capital base, but also, jointly and severally, bore direct, primary and
unlimited liability for the bank’s debts (Pohl, M. (1982), p. 205). This meant that due
care needed to be taken in the conduct of the lending business, which explains why the
co-operative banks, like the other commercial banks, focused on short-term loans,
92 in
the form of bills wherever possible (Pohl, M. (1982a), p. 338), in order to guarantee the
solvency and liquidity of the credit co-operatives. In other words, the credit co-
operatives engaged in “target group-oriented banking” in the tradition of the commercial
banks.
Like the savings banks, the co-operative banks also experienced a significant increase in
business volume from 1870 on. For example, the combined outstanding loan portfolio
of the Volksbanken grew from 61.03 million marks in 1865 to 1781.16 million marks in
1913. During the same period the number of credit co-operatives increased from 498 to
1,093 and their total membership from 165,595 to 815,065.
                                                
90  This finding of the historical–economic analysis is also relevant to the design of present-day micro
and small enterprise credit programmes in developing countries and transition economies insofar as it
supports the view of those who argue that projects of this type should not try to pursue many different
social-policy and development-policy goals simultaneously, no matter how legitimate those goals may
be in themselves. See Schmidt/Zeitinger (1994), p. 44.
91  The credit co-operatives were not managed by unpaid volunteers “but by full-time professionals, and
the managing directors were remunerated accordingly.” (Pohl, M. (1982a), p. 338).
92  Due to the specific features of agricultural production, this was not the case at the rural credit co-
operatives, the Raiffeisenbanken; see Pohl, M. (1982a), p. 210.90
5.6 Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, Banks and Enterprise Financing in
19
th Century Germany and in the Transition Economies of CEE/NIS –
Parallels and Implications Regarding the Suitability of the Promotional Bank
Approach as an Instrument for Improving the Financing Situation of the
Target Group
The preceding analysis of the German financial sector in the 19
th century describes a
situation which coincides in two respects with the situation facing the target group in the
transition economies of the late 20th century:
93
1. When Germans were granted the freedom to choose their trade or profession
(Gewerbefreiheit), a large private sector of micro, small and medium-sized
enterprises evolved, much as it did in the transition economies when the communist-
era prohibition on private enterprise was lifted. In both cases, the vast majority of
micro and small enterprises during the first years (and in Germany, decades) were
one-person operations or family businesses.
2. In 19th century Germany, as in today’s transition economies, SMEs were subject to
credit rationing unless they had personal connections or long-standing business
relationships to the people in positions of authority within the emerging financial
system. Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises therefore had to rely largely on
internally generated funds and on the informal financial sector to finance their
activities.
The “financial sector study” on 19
th century Germany also shows, however, that the
target group did not only perceive this credit rationing as an obstacle. At least as far as
the external provision of equity or quasi-equity, or external long-term debt financing is
concerned, the demand was not so great as might have been supposed given the
“shortage of capital” of which the target group itself also complained (Borchardt
(1961)). Some of the explanations put forward to account for this phenomenon could
also be applied to the transition economies. For example, Pissarides (1998, p. 11)
mainly attributes the target group’s hesitancy in drawing on venture capital funds for
Central and Eastern Europe to the “reluctance of SMEs’ managers to accept an outside
                                                
93  It should be noted that this comparison is not intended to imply that the transition economies are at
the same level of development as the German economy of the 19th century.91
shareholder and their exaggerated perception of the value of their companies,” i.e. to the
desire to remain independent which also characterised the first generation of German
entrepreneurs in the 19th century. In Albania the target group-oriented financial
institution FEFAD (now FEFAD-Bank) often found that borrowers wanted to repay
their loans ahead of the agreed maturity date, even though the average term was only 18
months, which in the context of the present-day Federal Republic of Germany would be
regarded as a rather short maturity. The experience of other first-tier target group-
oriented financial institutions, such as those which are implementing the projects
initiated by KfW, EBRD or IFC, as referred to in the introduction, confirms that credit
demand is focused primarily on working capital.
94 This means that, in the context of a
newly emerging sector of private micro, small and medium-sized enterprises the initial
hypothesis on which the promotional bank approach rests, namely that an appropriate
supply of financing for the target group is one that consists exclusively or at least
primarily of the “provision of long-term financing”, does not stand up to empirical
investigation.
The case of 19th century Germany is an example of a financial system that developed
largely endogenously, i.e. one that was not triggered by external forces or by
government action but was driven almost entirely by private enterprise. Given that a
similar pattern of development was observed in other now-developed economies,
95 and
also given that no alternative scenarios of successful financial system development
processes are available for comparison, it makes sense to examine this process for
evidence of characteristics which might serve as a reference for policies aimed at
replicating such a development in other parts of the world and in another age. Space
does not permit a discussion of the details of the theoretical considerations on which the
following selection is founded.
96 What follows is therefore merely a brief inventory of
the characteristics in question:
1. Banks evolve out of successful enterprises, many of them trade enterprises, which on
the one hand have sufficient financial strength to put up the original capital, and on
the other, through their activities in the real economy, have already acquired a core
                                                
94 See also Caprio (1995), p. 250.
95  See Winkler (1998) and Winkler (forthcoming).
96  See Winkler (forthcoming).92
of (credit) customers to whom they can successfully provide financial services and
especially credit.
2. At first, a bank’s asset-side business consists almost exclusively of short-term loans
to enterprises known personally to the bank’s owner(s) and/or manager(s).
3. At the start of their operations, banks have a high equity ratio.
4. In the course of the developmental process, the credit business becomes increasingly
formalised, progressively allowing banks to dispense with personal references. More
of their lending is now long-term, but short-term loans continue to predominate.
Meanwhile on the liabilities side, as the system of cashless payments expands,
external funds in the form of demand deposits become an increasingly significant
funding instrument, causing the equity ratio to decline.
The conditions that prevailed in the transition economies when financial systems in
those countries started to develop in the early 1990s were quite different from those that
existed in Germany in the early 19
th century, as outlined in Chapter 4. Nonetheless, after
nearly ten years of transition, parallels between the two situations are undoubtedly
visible. For example, the more successful of the new, small, privately owned banks in
the transition economies, e.g. in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia and
Armenia, are operating on basis that is definitely similar to that of the private bankers in
Germany 150 years ago: founded by successful (trade) enterprises, they provide short-
term loans to known enterprises on the basis of a relatively high equity ratio, and are
increasingly engaging in (cashless, international) payment transactions.
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97  In one of the author’s financial sector studies, the small, private-sector banks that had been operating
for a number of years in the country in question was praised for pursuing this policy. This prompted
criticism on the part of the client that had commissioned the study on the grounds that it is precisely
this policy which is responsible for the fact that the majority of the target group are denied access to
financial services. The misunderstanding, which was cleared up in a subsequent discussion, lay in the
different points of view and different assumptions which led the author and the client to their
respective assessments. These differences can be summed up as follows: If the emerging, small
private banks do not possess a generally applicable credit technology which enables them to lend to
firms, including those that are not well known to them, without incurring intolerably high risk-related
costs, then their concentration on lending to known firms, or on other, less risky lines of business,
such as payment services, is a rational response to this lack of an appropriate credit technology, and
as such it should be welcomed. From the point of view of the target group, on the other hand, this
behaviour is obviously to be condemned because it causes them to experience credit rationing.93
Given that the promotional bank approach claims to support financial system
development in transition economies, the evidence presented here poses the following
question: Is it not the case that the declared intention of the promotional bank approach
– to issue relatively large, long-term loans – in fact presupposes the existence of a
financial system which has already reached a higher stage of development than the
present financial systems of the transition economies, and especially of those countries
which have made least progress towards reform? If the initial stages of financial system
development are traditionally characterised by short-term lending on the basis of a high
equity ratio, as the analysis of the development of Germany’s financial system in the
19
th century would seem to demonstrate, then a promotional approach that emphasises
long-term lending by commercial banks on the basis of increased borrowing of funds
(from the promotional bank) appears inappropriate – also from the point of view of the
intended suppliers of credit, the commercial banks.
Finally, the development of the German financial system shows that one cannot simply
assume that catering to the target group will automatically be a high priority for the
commercial banks as they compete with each other for market share. This observation
endorses the view of all bilateral and multilateral donors that – assuming that the
justification for supporting SMEs is now generally undisputed – active intervention in
the financial sector on behalf of this target group is a necessity. In the 19
th century there
were no bilateral or multilateral donors, and hence the German example cannot serve
directly as a model for the design of financial sector projects of this type. Nonetheless,
there are lessons to be drawn from emergence of the German savings banks and credit
co-operatives. Here were two groups of institutions which devoted themselves to
serving the target group – one providing mainly asset-side services, the other offering
liability-side products – and whose establishment was motivated partly by the realisation
that the target group was being neglected by the existing commercial banks, and partly
by the recognition that the target group deserved to receive financial support.
Furthermore, these initiatives were set in motion either by “donors” in the shape of
prominent individuals and charitable foundations (in the case of the savings banks) or
by socially-, liberally- and commercially-minded figures (in the case of the urban and
rural credit co-operatives), and in this respect they can legitimately be compared with
the projects initiated by the donor community in developing countries and transition
economies.94
On the issue of how (or with which type of project) the financing situation of micro,
small and medium-sized enterprises can be improved, the following features of the
German savings banks and Volksbanken provide valuable pointers:
1. They are first-tier financial institutions, i.e. they were founded at the level of the
commercial banks.
2. They were founded and capitalised not by the state but by individuals and
institutions that wished to further the interests of the target group. It was not until the
savings banks and credit co-operatives had already established themselves that the
state gradually imposed a formal, regulatory framework on their evolution by
passing appropriate laws.
3. They pursued a business policy of “professionalisation”, commercialisation and
concentration on doing financial business with the target group. As both groups of
institutions evolved, this led to the following consequences:
- the charitable element (but not the target group orientation!) soon declined in
significance and was eventually abandoned altogether,
- cost efficiency and economic viability became a priority, and a professional
management with banking experience was put in charge of achieving this,
- on the credit side, the Volksbanken embraced the “banking tradition” of focusing
on short-term loans to finance working capital, while on the deposit side, the
savings banks introduced (cashless) payment facilities which gave its customers
additional encouragement to accumulate savings.
Given the parallels that exist between 19
th century Germany and the present-day
transition economies in terms of the stage of development attained by both the target
group and the financial system, it is reasonable to conclude that the development of the
German financial system in the 19
th century can serve as a valid reference for financial
sector projects aimed at promoting small and medium-sized enterprises in Central and
Eastern Europe and the NIS. Assuming this to be true, the pointers listed above make
clear that the promotional bank approach lacks most of the features that characterise the
“intervention” in the banking system represented by the 19
th century German savings
banks and credit co-operatives: Instead of being first-tier commercial banks,
promotional banks are second-tier institutions; instead of relying on private or at least
non-state initiatives, the state plays a dominant role in the creation of the promotional95
banks; instead of following the banking tradition of focusing initially on short-term
lending, the promotional bank approach advocates long-term lending with funds
borrowed from the promotional bank. Conversely, almost all of the features listed above
are embodied, albeit in various ways and combinations, in the donor-initiated project
designs that are based on the principles of “institution building, commercial approach
and financial system orientation”. The only significant difference is that the institutional
form chosen as the executing agency in the modern upgrading approach is not that of the
co-operative bank but rather that of a target group-oriented private commercial bank
initiated jointly by several different donors. One reason for this rejection of the co-
operative bank set-up is that past projects based on co-operative banks in developing
countries achieved disappointing results in practice (Krahnen/Schmidt (1994), pp. 52ff,
Schmidt/Zeitinger (1994), p. 20); another is that in most transition economies the co-
operative idea has been discredited by the communist past, so that efforts to rehabilitate
it and help it to achieve a breakthrough in practice would either be doomed to failure or
would take up an inordinate amount of time. The situation with savings banks is
different, however. The Russian savings bank, Sberbank, for example, is a key partner
of the Russia Small Business Fund project. At this institution, technical and financial
co-operation is being used to encourage and accelerate the process of development
which took place in the German savings banks system at the start of the 20
th century.96
6. The Suitability of the Promotional Bank Approach as an Instrument for
Developing the Financial System and SME Financing in the Transition
Economies – A Question of Situation Analysis and Empirical Results
In the preceding chapters the promotional bank approach was analysed against the
background of various situations. As the proponents of this approach refer to the
activities of KfW in the Federal Republic of Germany as a central empirical proof of the
validity of their hypothesis that the promotional bank concept is a suitable instrument
for improving the financing situation of small and medium-sized enterprises in the
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS, the analysis focused
initially on the development of post-World War Two Germany and the role of KfW.
This investigation revealed that in the early post-war years – certainly until 1955 and
arguably until 1971 – KfW did not pursue the promotional bank approach towards the
target group in any practical sense. On the contrary, it acted as a successful
reconstruction loan corporation in the classic mould, thanks largely to the outstanding
banking experience of its two most important founding figures.
In 1971, when the promotional bank approach was developed and put into practice on a
large scale by KfW, the prevailing conditions in the West German SME sector were
very different from those under which these enterprises operate in Central and Eastern
European transition economies. Whereas in Germany from 1971 on KfW’s aim as a
promotional bank was to counteract a competitive disadvantage which established small
and medium-sized enterprises were facing vis-à-vis large enterprises, the promotional
banks in the transition economies were and still are confronted with a situation in which
a target group consisting almost exclusively of micro and small enterprises is having to
fight for survival in an unfamiliar market environment characterised not least of all by
an extremely crisis-prone financial sector. The financial institutions in these countries
are in any case either not at all active in the financing of the private sector as a whole,
i.e. large enterprises as well as small and medium-sized ones, or they are very selective
in their lending, a policy which stems from their lack of appropriate credit technologies,
as is reflected in their high percentage of non-performing loans.
Moreover, judging by the relationship between the political and the economic spheres in
most of the reforming transition economies, and bearing in mind the prominent role of
politicians in defining a promotional bank’s mission, appointing its owners and guiding
its business policies, it appears highly unlikely that the new promotional banks will be
able to match the delicate balance between professional banking practice and political97
influence that has characterised the corporate governance of KfW since 1948. These
differences in regard to the most important categories on which the promotional bank
approach depends – target group, banking system and corporate governance – suggest
that the promotional banks in the transition economies, with the possible exception of
the most advanced reforming countries, face a daunting task if their intention is to reach
a significant percentage of the target group, and especially the small enterprises, by
applying the approach as it stands. The available – albeit insufficient – empirical
evidence does not contradict this assertion. To date, promotional banks have only gone
into operation in those countries that have already reached a relatively advanced stage of
the transition process. Furthermore, the SME business of these promotional banks
appears to consist primarily of lending to the larger firms within this target group.
Accordingly, they have probably done little to alleviate the credit rationing to which
micro and small enterprises are subject. And finally, the SME business does not
necessarily play the dominant role in relation to the other lines of business (e.g.
infrastructure and housing finance) which, according to the theory behind the approach,
a promotional bank may also pursue but only as a supplement to the core business of
SME support. From the standpoint of development policy, there is nothing wrong with
this shift of emphasis, given that there is an obvious need for support in these areas.
However, since the primary task of the promotional bank approach, by definition, is to
promote not only medium-sized but also small enterprises, and the financial sector as a
whole, it is questionable whether even the promotional banks that are already in
operation are actually achieving the goals for which the approach was designed.
Finally, given that the operating environment of the target group in the transition
economies is characterised by an emerging private sector and a banking system in the
process of being built, it seemed appropriate to consider whether lessons could be drawn
from the history of Western societies at a comparable stage of development which could
then be applied to promotional strategies for improving the financing situation of the
target group. To this end, the development of the target group, the banking system and
enterprise financing in 19
th century Germany was analysed. Not only quantitative but
also qualitative parallels were found to exist between this period in Germany’s
economic history and the present situation in many transition economies. Two results of
this situation analysis were of particular interest for an assessment of the promotional
bank approach. First, from a demand-side and also a supply-side perspective, it could be
argued that the most appropriate form of financing – i.e. the type of loans which
commercial banks should provide to small and medium-sized enterprises during such
phases of financial sector development – is not so much the long-term loan to finance98
fixed asset investments, but rather the short-term loan to finance working capital.
Second, the “interventions” that took place in the German financial system during the
19
th century in order to overcome the credit rationing experienced by the target group, or
more generally, to give the target group access to financial services, were based on
principles diametrically opposed to those behind the promotional bank approach. The
institutions involved were not second-tier institutions, they were not founded on
government initiative, and they did not engage, at least to any great extent, in long-term
lending. Rather the origins and development of the German savings banks and credit co-
operatives exhibit the features that characterise the institution-building approach to
development finance projects.
Every historical situation is unique. Consequently, every comparison between historical
situations is inevitably problematic. If, despite these reservations, historical comparisons
occupy such a large part of the present paper, it is because the explicit and implicit
equation of two historical situations – post-World War Two Germany and post-Cold
War Central and Eastern Europe – is a central argument put forward by the advocates of
promotional banks to justify that approach. Presumably, if it had not been for this
historical context, the suitability of the approach would have been subjected to more
critical scrutiny, given that its aims and spheres of activity are markedly similar to those
of the development banks, which the majority of development finance practitioners,
even in Germany, now regard as failures. In fact, the detailed comparative analysis
presented in this paper comes to an unambiguous conclusion: it is inadmissible to
equate the two historical situations, especially in terms of the target group, the banking
system and the corporate governance environment. Hence the comparison cannot be
accepted as evidence that the promotional bank approach is a suitable instrument for
improving the financing situation of small and medium-sized private-sector enterprises
in the transition economies. Before a conclusive evaluation can be given, however, more
detailed empirical analysis of the results achieved in the transition economies to date is
needed. Bearing in mind just how important the development of the financial system
and the SME sector is for the national economies of the countries concerned, it is to be
hoped that such an analysis will be presented soon.99
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